ORDER

1. This is an application for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council from an order of a Bench of this Court suspending the applicant who is an enrolled Advocate, for a period of three months. A preliminary objection is taken by the Government Advocate that no leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council can be given by this Court. It is urged that the suspension of the Advocate is in the exercise of the power especially conferred upon this Court by Clause (8), Letters Patent, and by the Bar Councils Act of 1926, and that when exercising such power the High Court is not exercising any jurisdiction, much less civil jurisdiction. It is therefore contended that Clause 30, Letters Patent, would not at all apply and there would be no appeal to the Privy Council. It is further contained that the case not being a civil case to which Sections 109 and 110, Civil P. C. can apply, no leave can be granted under those sections.

2. Reliance is placed on the view which has been expressed in some of the other High Courts in India. In Ganesh S. Dandvate v. Government Pleader, Bombay (1908) 32 Bom 106, it was laid down that a vakil of the Bombay High Court who had been suspended in the exercise of the disciplinary jurisdiction under the Letters Patent, could not be given leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council, as the order was not in the nature of a final judgment, decree or order within the meaning of the Letters Patent. Three cases previously decided by this Court were distinguished. In Bir Kishore Boy v. Emperor 1919 Pat 279, it was clearly held that the right of appeal to His Majesty in Council is confined to appeals from judgments, decrees or orders passed in the exercise of one or other of the classes of jurisdiction conferred by Clauses 9 to 27, Letters Patent of the Patna High Court and does not extend to the administrative or disciplinary powers conferred on the Court by the earlier clauses or by statute. The learned Chief Justice based his judgment on the view that the words "order made on appeal or otherwise as aforesaid" clearly refer to judgments, decrees or orders passed in the exercise of original jurisdiction, not being criminal jurisdiction, which were classified in Clauses 9 to 27, Letters Patent, and included Civil, Criminal, Admiralty, Testamentary, Intestate and Matrimonial jurisdiction, appellate and original, and did not include administrative or disciplinary powers conferred on the Court by Clause 8 and other earlier clauses.

3. This case was followed by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in the matter of Baghava Reddi 1922 Mad 440. The Patna High Court in re Sudhansu Bala Hazra 1922 Pat 603, followed the same ruling in declining to grant leave to appeal from an order refusing to enrol a lady practitioner. On the other hand, there are several cases of this Court in which it was considered that this Court has jurisdiction to grant leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council, leave was granted and objection was raised before their Lordships of the Privy Council. In re Parbati Charan Chatterji (1895) 17 All 498, leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council was granted by this Court and the appeal was entertained by their Lordships of the Privy Council without any objection having been raised by the opposite party. We have seen the paper book and verified the fact that the leave to appeal had been granted by this Court.

4. In re Rajendra Nath Mukerji (1900) 22 All 49, where an Advocate of this Court had been removed from the rolls, the High Court granted a certificate for appeal u/s 595, Civil P. C. and the appeal was entertained by their Lordships of the Privy Council. Section 595, Civil P. C., (Act 14 of 1882) corresponded to the present Section 109, Civil P. C. In re Sarbadhicary (1907) 29 All 95, an Advocate of this Court who had been suspended from practice for four years, leave was granted by the High Court to him to appeal to His Majesty in Council, though it appears that he also obtained special leave from the Priv