ORDER

Gyanendra Kumar, J. - Mr. R.C. Verma, with his usual ability, has raised a point of jurisdiction which was never agitated either before the Magistrate or before the Sessions Judge. However, the point, being one of jurisdiction, can be raised even at the revisional stage in this Court. In the instant case, the Applicants were convicted by Sri Bishal Chand Jain, Special Magistrate I Class, Saharanpur by his judgment and order dated 10-12-1965. The conviction was under two counts. u/s 427 IPC the accused were sentenced to a fine of Rs. 75/- and in default to undergo three months R.I. each, but u/s 352 IPC, they were sentenced to a fine of Rs. 25/- and in default to undergo 20 days R.I. each. Shri Jain had admittedly tried this case summarily.

2. The contention of Mr. R.C. Verma is that summary powers could not have been legally conferred on Shri Jain, inasmuch as he was not a Magistrate of I Class within the meaning of Sub-clause (b) of Section 260(1) Code of Criminal Procedure. The relevant words of the section are:

260. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Code,--

(a)... ... ... ...

(b) any Magistrate of the first class specially empowered in this behalf by the State Government,

(c)...may if he or they think fit, try in a summary way all or any of the following offences:

... ... ... ...

3. It is not disputed that the offences in question are those which could be tried summarily, if Shri Jain had specially been empowered in that behalf by the State Government in a legal manner. In this connection, Mr. Verma has invited my attention to the provisions of Sections 12 and 14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. u/s 12 it has been provided that the State Government may appoint as many persons as it thinks fit, besides the District Magistrate, to be Magistrates of the first, second or third class in any district outside the presidency towns. The State Government may further, from time to time, define local areas within which such persons may exercise all or any of the powers with which they may respectively be invested.

4. On the other hand Section 14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure speaks of conferment of powers of a Magistrate of the first, second or third class on any particular person or persons, possessing requisite qualifications. Such Magistrates are called 'Special Magistrates'. The argument is that u/s 12, a particular number of persons are appointed as Magistrates of the first, second or third class in a particular district, while u/s 14 only the powers of the first, second or third class Magistrates are conferred upon some specified persons, who are called Special Magistrates, but they are not appointed as Magistrates within the meaning of Section 12. Mr. Verma contends that unless and until a person is appointed as a Magistrate, he cannot enjoy summary powers u/s 260 Code of Criminal Procedure. The argument, though plausible, is without substance, for Clause (2) of Section 14 itself provides that Special Magistrates "shall be appointed for such term as the State Government may by general or special order direct". Thus it is abundantly clear that the Special Magistrates are also appointed by the State Government for a specified term and they are as good Magistrates as anybody else, enjoying the first, second or third clasp powers as the case may be.

5. Section 260 Code of Criminal Procedure relates to summary trials. It is noteworthy that Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 260 says that "any Magistrate of the first class specially empowered in this behalf by the State Government" may try in a summary way all or any of the specified offences. The term "any Magistrate" is very wide and obviously includes a Special Magistrate, a Judicial Magistrate, a Railway Magistrate, a Sub-Divisional Magistrate, etc. It cannot be argued, therefore, that a Special Magistrate, enjoying first class powers, is excluded from the ambit of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 260 Code of Criminal Procedure. In this connection Mr.