JUDGMENT

Kaul, J. - Though the opposite-party has not cared to appear at the hearing, all the facts and the law bearing thereon were placed before ma by Mr. Nairn Ullah, Counsel for the applicant. The matter for consideration is whether the suit: brought in the Court below was barred by time.

2. It appears that a promissory note for Rs. 200 was executed by Surat Singh in favour of the present applicant, Bhan Pra- tap Singh, on the 10th of August, 1937. A suit for recovery of the amount due under the note was instituted by Bhan Pratap Singh on the lltfc. of December, 19+1. The promissory note purported to be payable on demand, and as the suit was instituted more than three years after the note was executed, it would ordinarily be barred by time. Reliance was, however, placed by the plaintiff on Section 5 of Local Act X of 1937 which enacted that

in computing the period of limitation prescribed by the Limitation Act, 1908, or any other law for the time being in force for

(a) the institution of a suit in a Civil Court against an agriculturist for money or foreclosure . or sale in enforcement of a mortgage, and

(b) the execution of such decree as is referred to in Section 3, and not covered by Section 6, the period during which jthis Act shall remain in force shall be excluded.

(2) In computing; the period of 12 years pres- cribed by Section 48, Civil Procedure Code, 1908, the period during which this Act shall remain in -force shall be excluded.

3. This Act, (Temporary Postponement of Execution of Decree Act) came into force on the 1st of January, 1938, and was to remain in force ior six months. By Act 15 of 1938 and by Act 6 of 1940, this period of six months was extended to 24 months and 30 months respectively with the result that the Temporary Postponement of Exe- cution of Decrees Act remained in force till the 31st of December 1940, when it was repealed by the U. P. Debt Redemption Act 13 of 1940.

4. It was contended on behalf of the defendant in reply that the Temporary Postponement of Execution of Decrees Act having been repealed should be treated as obliter- ated altogether from the Statute Book and considered never to have existed. This contention was up held by the Court below and the suit was dismissed accordingly as time barred. The learned Judge in the Court below was of opinion that Section 5 of Act X of 1937 did not give any right or privilege or rtjmedy. To use his own language : "It simply extended the period of limitation and nothing more." It was according to him a law of procedure and as no one has a vested right in procedure the plaintiff could not take advantage of that provision after it was repealed. Reliance was placed by the learned Judge on the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Kalyan Singh Vs. Ajudhya Prasad, AIR 1938 All 502 . Re- ference was also made to the case of Mt. Begam Sultan Vs. Sarvi Begam . There is, however a decision of a Full Bench of the same High Court in Seth Radhey Lal v. Roop Ram 1942 AWR (H C) 315 : AIR 1942 All 396 where the point which arises in the present case was considered and a view different from that taken by the Judge in the Court below was adopted. It was held that the right conferred by Section 5 of Act 10 of 1937 was more in the nature of a vested right than a matter affecting merely procedure. In this view of the matter such a right would be applicable by Section 6 of the U. P. General Clauses Act (1 of 1904) which lays down :

6. Where any United Provinces Act repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not :

(a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal taken effect; or

(b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder ; or

(c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued, or incurred under any enactment so repealed, or ;

(d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in re