ORDER

S.C. Manchanda, J. - This is a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution by the tenant directed against the order of the State Government passed u/s 7Fof the U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act, reversing the order of the Commissioner who had confirmed the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer refusing to grant the landlord permission to file a suit for ejectment u/s 3 of the Act, The main ground taken in the writ petition was that the order of the State Government u/s 7F was not a speaking order as it did not give any reasons for setting aside the concurrent findings recorded by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. On the side of the landlord it was contended that the record of the case would show that the case had been carefully considered before the concurrent finding of the authorities was reversed by the State Government. The record accordingly was sent for and this has been perused This shows that the State Government wanted to be sure as to whether the landlord had any other shop other that the shop in the tenancy of the Petitioner. An enquiry was directed to be made through the local Tehsildar His report shows that both the parties were examined and their evidence in great detail recorded. The evidence runs into several pages and this was made a part of his report, which was sent in original to the State Government. The State Government on being satisfied that the landlord had no other shop except the one in the tenancy of the Petitioner gave the landlord permission to sue for ejectment after the lapse of period of one year to enable the Petitioner tenant to find alternative accommodation.

2. Mr. Kakkar the learned Counsel for the Petitioner has contended that although the Petitioner had taken part in the proceedings before the Tehsildar in the enquiry held by him and had in fact led evidence which was all sent to the State Government, nevertheless, it was the duty of the State Government to again give the Petitioner an opportunity of putting forward his case. He does not insist, because of the view consistently taken by this Court, that the hearing need not be oral but at least an opportunity of making a representation against the Tehsildar's report should have been furnished to him. For this proposition he relied upon several authorities of this Court. The first of these is Banarsi Das and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh (AIR 1965 All. 33), where it was laid down at p. 41 that although the District Magistrate had a complete discretion in the matter yet the rules of natural justice require that he should give the persons who are likely to be affected a chance of placing their view points before him. This case does not assist the Petitioner as the 'parties' admittedly had an opportunity of placing their view points, by leading evidence before the Tehsildar. The report of the Tehsildar had made no recommendation, he had merely set out the facts which he had gathered from the evidence. The evidence also having been forwarded there was no question of any further opportunity to be given to the Petitioner tenant to place his views against any report that may have been given by the Tehsildar.

3. The next authority relied upon vas the decision of Mehrotra, J. in Dr. J. t. Bhatia v. Smt. Victoria Rani (2) (1957) AWR 396, 401), where it was laid down that "it was not open to the revisional authority to assume the fact to be correct without giving sufficient opportunity to the Petitioner to meet those allegations." These observations were made in a different con-, text altogether and have no bearing on the question which arises in the present case. Reliance was next placed on the observations of the Supreme Court in M. Chockalingam and Another Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras and Another, AIR 1963 SC 1456 where it was laid down that in proceedings u/s 35 of the Income tax Act, it was incumbent upon the Income tax Officer under the law to issue a notice to the Pe