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1974 Supreme(All) 378

ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
R.N. SETH, J.
Sada Nand - Appellant
Versus
Lal Chand - Respondent
Second Appeal No. 2197 of 1968.
Decided On : 04-12-1974

Advocates appeared:
K.M. Dayal, Advocate, For the Appellant / B.D. Mandhyan, Advocate, For the Respondent

JUDGMENT

R.N. Seth, J. - The suit giving rise to the present appeal was filed by the plaintiff appellant for ejectment of the defendant and for recovery of arrears of rent and damages on the allegations that house No. 106/625 situate to Mohalia Deputy Ka Parao, Kanpur, was a post 1951 construction and Act No. III of 1947 was not applicable. It was alleged that the defendant was a tenant of a portion of this house on the first floor on a monthly rent of Rs. 20/-. The tenancy was terminated by a notice dated 19th June 1963.

2. The suit was contested on the ground that the accommodation was constructed much before 1951 and Act No. III of 1947 was applicable. The receipt of the notice and the rate of rent was admitted but it was asserted that the notice was illegal. It was further denied that any rent was due to the plaintiff.

3. The trial court decreed the suit holding that the accommodation was constructed after 1951 and that the notice was valid. The lower appellate court reversed that decree and dismissed the suit for ejectment and recovery of pendentive and future damages. The lower appellate court recorded a finding that one room and one kitchen were post 1951 construction and tee rest were post 1951 construction and Act No. III of 1947 was applicable. It further held that the notice terminating the tenancy was invalid.

4. Learned counsel for the appellant did not challenge the finding recorded by the lower appellate court regarding the time of the constructions. It was urged that the defendant was a tenant of only the room and the kitchen which were post 1951 construction and with regard to the rest of the accommodation be was only a licensee and not a tenant and was, therefore, liable to ejectment. The contention that the defendant was only a licensee of the courtyard, the latrine and the pipe is untenable. Originally when the defendant entered the premises as a tenant admittedly he was the exclusive tenant of the courtyard, the latrine and the pipe alongwith an old room in 1959 the defendant gave up possession of the old room and a newly constructed room and a kitchen were in his tenancy. It was further stipulated that the courtyard, the latrine and the pipe would be shared by him with another tenant. It may also be noted that before 1959 the defendant was paying Rs. 30/- per month as rent but when the courtyard, the latrine and the pipe became joint in 1959 the rent was reduced to Rs 20/- per month. Merely because after 1959 the courtyard, the latrine and the pipe ceased to be in exclusive use and possession of the defendant and he agreed to share it with another tenant would not convert his status from a tenant to a licensee. In the plaint also it has been specifically mentioned that the defendant was a tenant on the entire accommodation specified at the foot of the plaint. In view of that unequivocal admission in the plaint it is not open to the appellant to urge that for the aforesaid portions the defendant was only a licensee. The principle laid down in Laxmi Chand v. Ratan Bai, AIR 1927 Bombay 115, is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. In the aforesaid case a privy was meant for and used by a number of tenants and it was not included in the tenancy of any one of the tenants. In the instant case the courtyard, the latrine and the pipe were originally in the exclusive tenancy of the defendant and later on he agreed to share with another tenant. The only change brought about was that instead of being the sole tenant he became joint tenant of the aforesaid accommodation along with another tenant.

5. It was urged that the defendant was liable to ejectment at least from that portion of the accommodation which was constructed after 1951. Reliance was placed on section l-A of Act No. III of 1947 which excluded the applicability of the Act to a building or part of a building constructed after a certain bate. In my opinion, however, the plaintiff cannot get any advantage of the aforesaid provisi

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