JUDGMENT

V.G. Oak, J. - These three connected Special Appeals raise the question of scope of rule 176 of the Company Court Rules, 1959. Since the three appeals raise similar questions of fact and law, it will be sufficient to refer to the facts of one appeal. We refer to the facts in Special Appeal No. 13 of 1965. In this appeal, Mohan Lal is the appellant.

2. The Dawn Match Company - Limited, Allahabad, is in liquidation. Creditors came forward to prove their debts. One such claim was made by Mohan Lal, appellant. He claims to have advanced Rs. 3,490 to the Company on 31st December, 1944. On the first scrutiny, the Official Liquidator admitted the claim for Rs. 2,780-86. That was in the report, dated 1st February, 1962. But subsequently he applied under rule 176 of the Company Court Rules for the expunging of the entry from the list of debts. ` The application was opposed by Mohan Lal, creditor. The learned Company Judge overruled the objection, By this order, dated 19th November, 1964, the learned Judge allowed the Official Liquidator's application, and directed that the proof of the claim be expunged in toto. The appeal by Mohan Lal is directed against this order of the learned Company Judge.

3. The order under appeal was passed under rule 176 of the Company Court Rules, 1959. Rule 176 provides for expunging of proof, and runs thus :

"(1) If after the admission of a proof,-, the Liquidator has reason to think that the proof has been improperly admitted or admitted by a mistake, he may apply to the Court upon notice to the creditor who made the proof, to expunge the proof or reduce its amount, as the case may be.

(2) Any creditor or contributory may also apply to the Court to expunge a proof or reduce the amount thereof, if the Liquidator declines to move in the matter, and on such application, the Court may pass such orders as it may think just. "

4. The main contention of Mr. M. N. Shukla, appearing for the appellants, is that, revision of the list of debts was barred by the principle of res judicata. He drew our attention to several cases dealing with the general principle of res judicata and constructive res judicata. Those principles would have no doubt precluded revision of the list of debts, but for the existence of rule 176. Rule 176 expressly empowers the Court to expunge an entry relating to proof of a debt. The power conferred by rule 176 is analogous to the power of review. When a Court exercises the power of review, no considerations relating to res judicata will arise.

5. Mr. Shukla further contended that action under rule 176 ought to be confined to mistakes due to inadvertence. rule 176 should not be extended to a case, where the Official Receiver raises the question of limitation for the first time upon an application under rule 176. The material words in rule 176 are : " the proof has been improperly admitted or admitted by mistake". These words are comprehensive enough to cover mistakes of fact and law. Rule 176 will also apply where the Official Liquidator failed on the initial occasion to consider the question of limitation, but came to consider that point subsequently.

6. Mr. Shukla further contended that rule 176 ought to be confined to those cases where the earlier proceeding has terminated with the report or action by the Official Liquidator. The rule will not cover a case where a decision by the Liquidator has merged in a decision by the Court. Mr. Shukla informs us that in the present case, although the Official Liquidator was prepared to admit the debt in 1962, he was not prepared to allow compound interest to the creditor. The learned Company Judge disallowed compound interest. That decision was confirmed in appeal by a Division Bench of this Court. Mr. Shukla, therefore, contended that, the decision of the Official Liquidator having merged in the decision by the Court, there was no room for applying rule 176. We are unable to agree. No such limitation is to be found in rule 176. Rule 176 empowers t