JUDGMENT

B. Dayal, J. - This is an Ex. Second Appeal by the decree-holder. He obtained a decree from the court of Small Causes at Bombay and got it transferred for execution to the court of the Munsif at Jaunpur. In execution of that decree, he got immoveable property attached. The judgment-debtor objected to the execution on the ground that in view of the amendment for Sec. 42, C. P. C. by the U.P. Civil Laws Amendment Act, 1954, the transferee court could not execute the decree against immoveable property. Both the courts below upheld the objection and disallowed execution against immoveable property.

2. In this Second Appeal it is contended that a decree passed by a Presidency Small Cause Court is not subject to the restriction made by the new amendment in Sec. 42, C. P C. in this State. It is contended that under Sec. 31 of the Presidency Small Cause Court Act, the President, Small Cause Court could transfer a decree for execution against immoveable property to a regular court or to the High Court and upon such transfer the decree could be executed by sale for immoveable property. Consequently, this right has not been taken away by the amendment of Sec. 42, C. P. C. I am unable to accept this contention. A decree transferred for execution to a court in this State can only be executed according to law enforcible by the courts in this State (Sec. 40 C. P. C.). By the new amendment in Sec. 42, C. P. C. the executing court can only exercise those powers which the court passing the decree had and since the Presidency Small Cause Court had itself no right to execute the decree against immoveable property, such a right cannot be exercised by the executing court in this State. It is wrong to say that Sec. 31 for the Presidency Small Cause Court Act conferred any right upon the decree-holder by merely permitting the Presidency Small Cause Court to transfer a decree for execution to a court which could execute against immoveable property.

3. It was also contended that the law laid down in the case of Karanchand v. Gurdyal, 1960 ALJ 352, does not lay down good law. That case undoubtedly is a single Judge decision of this Court but that view has now been confirmed by a Division Bench for this Court in Bhukan Lal v. Ishwar Dayal Singh, 1963 ALJ 220. I am bound by this decision and see no reason to take a different view.

4. There is no force in this appeal and it is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs in this appeal.

Appeal dismissed.