JUDGMENT

Satish Chandra, J. - One Bissu was a co-sharer in the holding in dispute. He was murdered by his wife, Smt. Deoki. The other co-tenure-holders remained in possession of the entire holding. Smt. Deoki was convicted for the murder and sentenced to imprisonment for life. After serving imprisonment for 10 years, she was released. She then claimed her share in the holding. The Deputy Director of Consolidation has accepted her claim. He repelled the objection of the co-tenure-holders that being the murderer of her husband, Bissu, she could not be an heir to him. This view of law has been challenged in the present writ petition.

2. It is true that the principles of Hindu Law cannot be imported into the special rights created by the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. In Mahendra Singh v. Attar Singh, 1967 R.D. 191, it was held that principles of coparcenery property are not applicable to bhumidhari rights, Similarly, in Dulli v. lmerti Devi, 1966 A.L.J. (Rev.) 29 (F.B.) it was held that the principle of Hindu Law making a posthumous son an heir was,not applicable to succession which was governed by the U. P. Tenancy Act, 1939. In Ramji Dixit v. Bhrigu Nath, A.I.R. 1964 A.L.J. 197 (F.B.) Desai, C. J. observed that an agricultural tenant has no religion and no personal law except as expressly provided in the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The Act applies to Hindus, Muslims, Christians, etc., regardless of their religion, and, so, regardless of their personal law except as regards succession in certain cases. It contains its own provisions regarding inheritance and transfers; and when it has left certain matters to be governed by the personal law, it has done so by an express provision. In view of all these authorities, it can be held that rights created by the statutes would normally be governed by the provisions thereof. The principles of personal law would not automatically become applicable. They would be applicable only if they are permitted to apply by the concerned statute. So, if it were a principle of Hindu law that a murderer is not an heir of the murdered person, it could be excluded on this hypothesis. But, that is not so.

3. In Kenchaya Kom Sanyellappa Hosmani v. Girimallappa, A.I.R. 1924 PC 209, the Privy Council observed that really the Hindu law did not expressly lay down any such principle that a murderer is not an heir to the murdered person, but that is a principle of equity, justice and good conscience, Lord Philli-more, speaking for the Judicial Committee, held that statutes regulating heirship or descent, or giving force to wills or to the devises contained in the wills should be read as not intended to affect paramount questions of public policy or depart from well-settled principles of jurisprudence. On this ground, it was held that a murderer is excluded from being an heir to the person murdered by him. It was also held that paramount principle of public policy was that the murderer should be treated as non-existent on the date of the death of the murdered person. He could not form stock for a fresh line of descent.

4. According to this decision, statutory provisions for succession will normally be deemed to have implicit in them the para-mount principles of public policy or of jurisprudence. Those principles will apply to succession governed by the statutory provisions unless there is something to the contrary in the statutes.

5. The principle that a murderer becomes non-existent in relation to the murdered person is not a principle of Hindu law. It is a principle of public policy. It will, therefore, be applicable to succession governed by the Tenancy Act or the Zamindari Abolition Act. There is no provision in either of these Acts, which may, either expressly or by any implication, exclude the application of this principle of public policy that the murderer heir is in law non-existent on the date of murder.

6. The position, therefore, would be that when Bissu died, his widow, Sm