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2018 Supreme(All) 1595
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
J.J. MUNIR, J.
Sushil Kumar - Appellant
Versus
State of U.P. and Another - Respondent
Criminal Miscellaneous Bail Cancellation Application No. 1 of 2018 and Criminal Appeal No. 3419 of 2017
Decided On : 09-05-2018
Krishna Murari Tripathi, Adv., Dileep Kumar, Adv., Raj Kumar Singh, Adv.
Headnote:
Bail Cancellation - Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act - 14, 14-A - The court discussed the provisions of Sections 14 and 14-A of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, and the appellate jurisdiction under Section 14-A(2) of the Act. It highlighted the exclusive nature of the appellate powers under Section 14-A(2) and the absence of a statutory source for the power of cancellation to be exercised like those available under Section 439(2) of the Code. The judgment emphasized that the power to cancel bail is not inherent in the Court that grants bail and is traceable to a different and distinct statutory provision.
Fact of the Case:
The application sought the cancellation of bail granted to the accused in a case under Sections 376, 506 IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. The question was whether an application seeking cancellation of bail granted by the Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction under Section 14-A(2) of the Act can be entertained.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the power to cancel bail is not available as a power of review or as a facet of the power to grant bail. It emphasized the exclusive nature of the appellate powers under Section 14-A(2) of the Act and concluded that the Court does not retain or have any power to cancel bail granted by the judgment in appeal.
Issues: The main issue was the maintainability of the application seeking cancellation of bail granted by the Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction under Section 14-A(2) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.
Ratio Decidendi: The court emphasized that the power to cancel bail is not inherent in the Court that grants bail and is traceable to a different and distinct statutory provision. It highlighted the exclusive nature of the appellate powers under Section 14-A(2) of the Act and concluded that the Court does not retain or have any power to cancel bail granted by the judgment in appeal.
Final Decision: The Bail Cancellation Application was held to be not maintainable and was dismissed without prejudice to the right of the applicant to seek other remedies.
J.J. MUNIR, J.
1. Heard Sri Krishna Kant Dwivedi, learned counsel for the appellant in Criminal Misc. Bail Cancellation Application No.1 of the 2018 and Sri Indrajeet Singh Yadav, learned AGA on behalf of the State on the question of maintainability of the present application.
2. This application has been made on behalf of Jai Singh Chero representing the victim Savitri Kumari Chero (since deceased), his daughter, who is the first informant of case crime no.52 of 2017, under Sections 376, 506 IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, Police Station Kone, District Sonebhadra, seeking cancellation of bail granted by this Court vide judgment and order dated 04.09.2017 by allowing the instant appeal under Section 14-A(2) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act').
3. The question on which learned counsel for the appellant and learned A.G.A. were heard at length on 30.03.2018 was as to whether an application seeking cancellation of bail granted by this Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction under Section 14-A(2) of the Act can be cancelled on an application moved by the informant/complainant or for that matter anyone who would have that locus to seek cancellation, if it were a case of bail granted by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Code').
4. The question has arisen in the context of a very special provision for bail under the Act that finds place in Chapter IV of the Act, in particular, Section 14-A of the Act dealing with appeals. It would be gainful to quote the provisions of Sections 14 and 14-A of Chapter IV of the Act. The said provisions read as under:-
"Section 14 - For the purpose of providing for speedy trial, the State Government shall, with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of the High Court, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify for each district a Court of Session to be a Special Court to try the offences under this Act.
14A. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure,1973, an appeal shall lie, from any judgment, sentence or order, not being an interlocutory order, of a Special Court or an Exclusive Special Court, to the High Court both on facts and on law.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (3) of section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, an appeal shall lie to the High Court against an order of the Special Court or the Exclusive Special Court granting or refusing bail.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, every appeal under this section shall be preferred within a period of ninety days from the date of the judgment, sentence or order appealed from:
Provided that the High Court may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of ninety days if it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the period of ninety days:
Provided further that no appeal shall be entertained after the expiry of the period of one hundred and eighty days.
(4) Every appeal preferred under sub-section (1) shall, as far as possible, be disposed of within a period of three months from the date of admission of the appeal."
5. A perusal of the provisions of Sections 14 and 14-A of the Act generally indicates that the scheme of the Act to invests the Special Courts or Exclusive Special Courts notified or established under the Act to take cognizance of and decided cases relating to offence under the Act. There is not much quarrel on the issue nor does the scheme of the Act, in particular, Chapter IV spare scope for it that it is only the Special Court or Exclusive Special Court that are empowered to try and determine as exclusive fora offences under the Act.
6. A close reading of Section 14-A(2) of the Act leads to the u
