The principle of parity in bail applications does not apply in the same manner when the bail of one accused has been rejected. It is essential to disclose all relevant and material facts and circumstances of the case, as well as the fate of similar matters in other courts, to avoid contradictory findings and sustain public faith in the judicial institution.

1. This third bail application has been filed seeking the release of the applicant on bail in Case Crime No.100 of 2016, under Sections 147, 148, 149, 302, 307,504 I.P.C., Police Station-Narkhi, District- Firozabad. The first bail application was rejected by this Court on 18.10.2016 on merits and the second bail application was rejected by this Court on 19.1.2018 in non-prosecution.

2. Heard learned counsel for the applicant and learned A.G.A. for the State. Perused the record.

3. The only submission raised by the counsel for the applicant is that subsequently after the rejection of the bail application of the accused-applicant, the co-accused Harikesh and Rajpal, have been granted bail by other Benches of this Court on 3.11.2016 and 19.11.2016 respectively, and therefore, on the ground of parity the applicant also may be released on bail as the evidence against the applicant bears factual semblance with the evidence available against the aforesaid co-accused.

4. Learned A.G.A. has opposed the prayer for bail.

5. The perusal of bail order passed in favour of co-accused reveals that the factum or the order of rejection of applicant's bail was never brought to the notice of the aforesaid Bench of this Court. It is difficult to say as to what view would have been taken by other Bench, if this relevant fact would have been brought to its notice. The perusal of bail rejection order passed by this Court reveals that the merits of the case have already been gone into and this Court did not find it fit to release the applicant on bail. If before passing the order in the case, some bail order with regard to another co-accused is available and is brought to the notice of the Court then the Court pays due regard to the same. Not that the ground of parity is any absolute rule of law but ordinarily unless there are strong circumstances to take a different view, the view taken by other Benches is considered, respected and paid due regards by all Courts. But the situation is altogether different when a particular view has already been taken and it is found that subsequently the co-accused has obtained bail from another Bench and that too by suppressing the material factum of rejection of present applicant's bail. It is wholly unreasonable and unjustifiable to argue that just because subsequently another co-accused has succeeded to obtain bail after suppressing this Court's order, this should be good ground for this Court to revisit the findings given by it earlier and change its order just to bring the same in consonance with the subsequent orders passed with regard to co-accused by another Bench. Contention in this regard is fatuous and specious both. If already some order has been passed by some Court on the point of bail or with regard to any matter which is similar in nature then such an order must be placed before another Court while it is being called upon to adjudicate upon such matter, if not as a principle of law then at least as a matter of good faith and fair play. It is not at all necessary that if the bail of co-accused has been rejected by another Bench then the bail applications of all other accused persons of the same case must be rejected by all other benches, if they are so moved. The principle of parity is normally pressed successfully in order to obtain the bail, if the allegations and the evidence in support of them are same with regard to such accused persons, but the principle of parity does not apply in the same manner where the bail of one accused has been rejected. But and nevertheless, it is certainly the right of the Court to be informed about all relevant and material facts and circumstances of the case and also the fate of similar matters which attended them earlier in different Courts or in the same Court. It is only after being fully informed and after considering all such facts that a particular court can formulate its view correctly. Such disclosure goes a long way to avert uncalled-for dichotomy in ju