A compromise should aim to resolve a dispute between the parties and not aggravate it.

Salil Kumar Rai, J.

Heard Dr.Vinod Kumar Rai, counsel for the petitioner, Shri Sanjai Singh, counsel for the respondent as well as Standing Counsel representing respondent nos.1, 2 & 3.

2. The facts of the case are that petitioner instituted Case No.10 of 1986 under section 176 of the U.P Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act, 1950 against respondent no. 4 praying for partition of the suit property. Subsequently, an application dated 19.3.1986 was filed in Case No.10 of 1986 ostensibly incorporating the terms of an alleged compromise entered into between the petitioner and respondent no.4 whereby the parties had agreed for partition of the suit property in accordance with the terms of the compromise. The said compromise application was stated to be signed by the petitioner as well as respondent no.4. However, subsequently, but before the compromise application was verified by the Court and made a decree of the Court, respondent no. 4 filed an application dated 7.5.1986 in Case No. 10 of 1986 denying the compromise and in the said application, it was alleged by respondent no.4 that the alleged compromise was never read over to respondent no.4. The Trial Court i.e the respondent no. 3 vide its order dated 18.7.1989 rejected the compromise application dated 19.3.1986 on the ground that the compromise would only aggravate the dispute between the petitioner and respondent no.4 i.e the plaintiff and the defendant and shall not resolve the dispute between the said parties regarding partition of the suit property frustrating the purpose behind decreeing the suit on the basis of compromise. Against the order dated 18.7.1989 passed by respondent no.3 the petitioner filed Revision No. 217/191 of 1989 and the said revision was dismissed by respondent no.2 by its order dated 6.12.1990. Consequently, the petitioner filed another revision before the Board of Revenue which was registered as Revision No.24 of 1990-91 and the Board of Revenue i.e respondent no. 1 vide its order dated 27.12.1990 dismissed the said revision. While passing the order dated 27.12.1990, the Board of Revenue has recorded its opinion that respondent no.4 could not be tied to the compromise dated 19.3.1986 if the same was not voluntarily executed by him.

3. The orders dated 18.7.1989, 6.12.1990 and 27.12.1990 passed by respondent nos.1, 2 & 3 have been challenged in the present writ petition.

4. It has been argued by the counsel for the petitioner that the respondent no.4 had not denied his signatures on the compromise and therefore, the Courts' below had erred in law in dismissing the compromise application without recording any finding on the issue whether respondent no.4 had signed the aforesaid application or not. It has been contended that in absence of any finding on the aforesaid issue, the Courts' below could not have rejected the compromise application and were bound under the law to decree Case No.10 of 1986 on the basis of compromise filed on 19.3.1986.

5. I have considered the matter and submissions of the counsel for the petitioner. Assuming that respondent no.4 had signed the compromise dated 19.3.1986, there was no restriction, under the law, on respondent no. 3 to withdraw from the compromise dated 19.3.1986 before any decree was passed on the basis of the said compromise. It is admitted that the respondent no. 4 had filed an application denying the compromise and stating that he was not agreeable to the terms incorporated in the compromise dated 19.3.1986. Thus the argument of the counsel for the petitioner that the impugned orders passed by respondent nos. 1, 2 & 3 are contrary to law in as much as no finding has been recorded in the same on the issue that whether respondent no.4 had signed the compromise has no force and is rejected. Further, I find no illegality in the reasons given by the Trial Court that the purpose of a compromise is to resolve a dispute between the litigating parties and the alleged compromise filed by the petitioner in Cas