Objection to territorial or pecuniary jurisdiction does not render a final decree void, and objections to jurisdiction cannot be raised except in the manner and subject to the conditions mentioned in the relevant provisions.

B. AMIT STHALEKAR, J.

1. Heard Shri A.K. Upadhyay, learned counsel for the petitioners and Shri Rajendra Babu Gaur, learned counsel for the respondents.

2. The petitioner, in the writ petition, prays that the order of the District Judge, Hathras dated 15.12.2018 rejecting the petitioners' transfer application No. 309 of 2018 (Dinesh Kumar and others vs. Durvijay Singh) may be set aside.

3. Contention of the petitioners is that the Civil Judge (Senior Division) has no pecuniary jurisdiction' to hear the matter since after the amendment in the C.P.C. all pecuniary jurisdiction upto Rs. 5,00,000/- is vested in the Civil Judge (Junior Division). The District Judge, however, in appeal has held:

(i) that there was a direction of the High Court to decide the suit expeditiously, and therefore, transferring the matter to the court of Civil Judge (Junior Division) would unnecessarily delay the hearing of the suit, (ii) The Court below has held that an objection to territorial jurisdiction or pecuniary jurisdiction does not go to the root of the matter, and therefore, would not render the final decree as void.

(3) Reference has been made to the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in the Case of M/s Pankaj Hotel and another vs. Bal Mukund (Deceased) through his legal representatives and others, (2018) 126 AllLR 334, wherein has held:-

"The Code of Civil Procedure has made a distinction between law of inherent jurisdiction and objection to territorial jurisdiction and pecuniary jurisdiction. Whereas an inherent lack of jurisdiction may make the decree passed by that court to be one without jurisdiction or void in law, a decree passed by a court lacking territorial jurisdiction or pecuniary jurisdiction does not automatically become void."

4. Similar view has been taken by the Supreme Court in the case of Subhash Mahadevasa Habib vs. Nemasa Ambasa Dharmadas (dead) by legal representatives and others, (2007) 13 SCC 650, wherein the Supreme Court has held in para 33 as under:-

"What is relevant in this context is the legal effect of the so-called finding in OS No. 4 of 1972 that the decree in OS No. 61 of 1971 was passed by a court which had no pecuniary jurisdiction to pass that decree. The Code of Civil Procedure has made a distinction between lack of inherent jurisdiction and objection to territorial jurisdiction and pecuniary jurisdiction. Whereas an inherent lack of jurisdiction may make a decree passed by that court one without jurisdiction or void in law, a decree passed by a court lacking territorial jurisdiction or pecuniary jurisdiction does not automatically become void. At best it is voidable in the sense that it could be challenged in appeal therefrom provided the conditions of Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure are satisfied."

5. In the recent judgment in the case of Sneh Lata Goel vs. Pushplata and others; civil appeal No. 116 of 2019 decided on 7th of January, 2019 the Supreme Court has taken the same view that an objection to territorial jurisdiction or pecuniary jurisdiction does not go to the root of the subject matter of the suit and would not render a final decree as void. Paragraphs 17 to 26 of the same reads as under:-

'17. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent has placed a considerable degree of reliance on the judgment of four Judges of this Court in Kiran Singh (supra). In that case, there was a dispute in regard to the valuation of the suit. The issue would ultimately determine the forum to which the appeal from the judgment of the trial court would lie. If the valuation of the suit as set out in the plaint was to be accepted, the appeal would lie to the district court. On the other hand, if the valuation as determined by the High Court was to be accepted, the appeal would lie before the High Court and not the District Court. It was in this background that this Court held that as a fundamental principle, a decree passed by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity and that its validity could be