The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation and application of the Limitation Act, specifically the distinction between Article 62 and Article 113 in the context of enforcing payment of money secured by a mortgage or otherwise charged upon immovable property.

R.K. GUPTA, J. (CHAIRPERSON)

1. They are heard. This is an appeal preferred by the appellants under Section 20 of the RDDBFI Act, 1993 challenging the judgment passed by the DRT on 29th November, 2010, by which the Tribunal has allowed the original application filed by the Bank and has directed to issue the recovery certificate against the appellants to the tune of Rs. 10,13,858/- along with cost and future interest @ 16% per annum from 19th December, 2004 till realization. During the pendency of the present appeal, the appellant No. 2-Mohindra Singh has expired, therefore, on the application, his legal heirs have been substituted. The appellant No. 1 was the borrower and the deceased-appellant No. 2 was the guarantor. The loan was sanctioned by the respondent-LIC for a sum of Rs. 2.50 lacs for construction of the shopping complex for commercial use and the same was sanctioned on the application so moved by the appellant No. 1.

2. The deceased-appellant No. 2 was the guarantor towards the said loan. Since the amount was not paid by the appellants, therefore, the respondent filed an original application for recovery of its dues under Section 19 of the REDDBFI Act, 1993 before the Tribunal.

3. It was the specific case of the appellant No. 1 that the loan was called by issuing the legal notice to the appellant No. 1 and the legal notice as such was issued on 18th May, 1991, which is Ext. No. A-12.

4. The Tribunal was of the opinion that Article 62 of the Limitation Act for the purpose of filing of the Original Application under Section 19 of the RDDBFI Act, 1993 would apply.

5. It was the case of the appellants that in the present case, since the loan has been recalled by the respondent, therefore, Article 62 shall have no application, but the limitation will be regulated for the purpose of filing the Suit for recovery of the money by Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

6. This is to be seen that the last payment was made by the appellants on 5th November, 1994 for a sum of Rs. 4400/-. Thereafter, no payment was made by the borrower and an application for recovery of money under Section 19 of the RDDBFI Act, 1993 was moved in the year 2004 by the respondent.

7. The question in the present appeal is that whether Article 62 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply or Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply? For the purpose of convenience, the Article 62 and Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963 are reproduced as under:

“62 To enforce payment of money secured by a mortgage or otherwise charged upon immovable property Twelve years When the money sued for becomes due.

113. Any Suit for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this Schedule. Three years When the right to sue accrues.”

8. It is evident from the aforesaid that the Article 62 provides the period of limitation to enforce payment of money secured by a mortgage or otherwise charged upon the immovable property and the limitation of 12 years is provided which commences from when the money sued for becomes due.

9. So far as the Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is concerned, it provides a period of three years for filing the Suit for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this Schedule and the commencement of the period of limitation will start when the right to sue accrues.

10. The Para Nos. 10 and 11 as well as 13 of the notice which was issued by the respondent-LIC on 18th May, 1991, which is Ext. No. A-12, are relevant and the same are reproduced as under:

(10) That you noticee No. 1 cheated my client and thereby dishonestly induced the Corporation to deliver a sum of Rs. 1,24,000/- out of the sanctioned loan of Rs. 2,20,000/- committing an offence punishable under Section 420 of the Penal Code and other allied sections.

(11) That as a result of deliberate suppression and concealment of facts by noticee No. 1 regarding ownership over Khasra No. 412/3 aforesaid, my client has been rendered without any security or immovable pr