Back
2004 Supreme(All) 2431
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD AT LUCKNOW BENCH
K.S. RAKHRA, J.
Chandan Lal Sahajwani - Appellant
Versus
Union of India(UOI) and Others - Respondent
Second Civil Appeal No. 282 of 1985
Decided on : 10-02-2004
Advocate Appeared:
For the Appellant : L.P. Shukla
For the Respondent: Mohd. Arif Khan
The termination of probation must be in accordance with the rules and orders governing probation, as per the R.P.F. Act, 1957 and the R.P.F. Rules, 1959.
Headnote:
Probation - Railway Protection Force - R.P.F. Rules, 1959, Section 6, Section 9 - The court discussed the powers of the appointing authority and the Chief Security Officer under the R.P.F. Act, 1957 and the R.P.F. Rules, 1959. It interpreted the agreement executed under Rule 23 and its relationship with Rule 25 of the Rules. The court concluded that the termination of the appellant's probation was in accordance with the rules and orders governing probation.
Fact of the Case:
The appellant, appointed as Rakshak in R.P.F., had his probation terminated by the Respondent No. 3. He filed a suit which was later reversed in appeal.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the termination of the appellant's probation was in accordance with the rules and orders governing probation.
Issues: (1) Whether the Respondent No. 3 had the authority to terminate the appellant's probation during the period of probation. (2) Whether the competent authority to terminate the appellant's probation was only the Chief Security Officer.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the termination of the appellant's probation was in accordance with the rules and orders governing probation, as per the R.P.F. Act, 1957 and the R.P.F. Rules, 1959.
Final Decision: The appeal was dismissed.
K.S. RAKHRA, J.
1. This is a second appeal against the judgment and decree dated 18.3.1985 passed by the Additional District Judge, Lucknow allowing the Civil Appeal No. 200 of 1984 of the Respondent and setting aside the judgment and decree dated 6.2.1984 passed by the learned Tribunal Court in Regular Suit No. 368 of 1982.
2. I have heard Sri. L.P. Shukla advocate for the Appellant and Mohd. Arif Khan advocate for Respondent.
3. The Appellant was selected and appointed as Rakshak in R.P.F. in the year 1977. He was under probation which was to expire in June, 1980 but prior to that, he was issued a show cause notice on 22.8.1979 by the Respondent No. 3. After considering his reply, the probation of the Appellant was terminated on 5.9.1979 by the order of Respondent No. 3. The Appellant preferred a departmental appeal which was rejected by the Respondent No. 2 on 14.11.1979. The Appellant then, filed regular suit in the civil court, which was decreed but the decree has been reversed in appeal by the first Appellant court. The impugned order was passed by the Respondent No. 3 in purported exercise of powers conferred on him by Rule 25 of the Railway Protection Force Rules, 1959. Admittedly, the Appellant had also executed an agreement in the form in Appendix-A to the said Rules in accordance with Rule 23 of the said Rules.
4. The substantial question of law raised in this appeal are:
(1) Whether during the period of probation, the Respondent No. 3 who was below the rank of Chief Security Officer but was admittedly, the appointing authority, could issue a show cause notice and take action against the Appellant in exercise of powers conferred under Rule 25 of the R.P.F. Rules, 1959 and could pass the order dated 5.9.1979 terminating the probation of the Appellant.
(2) Whether in view of the terms of agreement executed by the Appellant under Rule 23 of the R.P.F. Rules, 1959, the competent authority to terminate the probation of the Appellant was only the Chief Security Officer.
5. Admittedly, the rank of 'Rakshak' falls within the definition of Member of Force and the Chief Security Officer and the Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 are superior officers as defined under Clause (f) of Section 2 of the R.P.F. Act, 1957. Section 6 of the Act prescribes that the appointment of member of the Force, shall vest with the Chief Security Officer who shall exercise that power in accordance with Rules made under the Act. Provided that the power of appointment under this section may also be exercised by such other superior officers as the Chief Security Officer concerned may, by order specify in this behalf. Section 9 of the Act confers power on the superior officer to pass an order of dismissal ; removal, etc. on the members of the force. The Railway Protection Force Rules, 1959 have been framed in exercise of powers conferred by Section 21 of the Act.
6. In the case of Union of India (UOI) and Others Vs. Rajendra Singh, AIR 1993 SC 205, the Apex Court while interpreting these provisions held that any superior officer defined under the Act, could exercise the powers mentioned in Section 9 (1) and (2) of the Act. Thus, there is no dispute that the Respondent No. 3 could also take action in the matter as appointing authority.
7. The argument of the learned Counsel for the Appellant is that the agreement executed in compliance of Rule 23 of the aforesaid Rules, limits the exercise of powers of termination of service to the Chief Security Officer. The said agreement clause reads as follows:
2. I understand and agree that my services can be terminated:
(a) by the Chief Security Officer at any time during the period of any initial training or the period of my probation thereafter on issue of notice of one month or the tender of one month's pay in lieu of such notice ; or
(b) by the appointing authority, without notice, on my failure to pass the final examination of the initial training course.
8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the Respondent is, how
