A sale deed executed by a de facto guardian is void and can be disregarded by the consolidation authorities. A person who is legally disabled to bring an action in a court of law is entitled to the benefit of Section 6 of the Limitation Act, which protects their rights.

K.N. Singh, J.

Onkar Nath Dubey, the Petitioner, filed objection u/s 9A of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act claiming one half share in Khata No. 65 of Village Kachchwa Bojh pargana Bhadohi district Varanasi, which was recorded in the basic year as Bhumidhari of Alakh Deo. His objection was contested by Alakhdeo, opposite party No. 2 on the ground that Adinath, as guardian of Onkar Nath Dubcy Petitioner, had executed a said deed on 19-12-1953 transferring the said khata to him for consideration. Since then he has continued in possession and his name was also mutated in the revenue papers. The Consolidation Officer rejected the Petitioner's claim by his order dated 7-5-1970. The Settlement Officer (Consolidation) affirmed the order of the Consolidation Officer in appeal. The Deputy Director of Consolidation dismissed the Petitioner's revision and upheld the order of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation). Aggrieved the Petitioner filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the aforesaid three orders of the consolidation authorities dismissing his claim for one half share in the Khata in dispute.

2. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner urged that Adinath was a blind person since birth. He was the uncle of the Petitioner. He had no legal authority or right to transfer the Petitioner's share in the land included in the Khata in question by the sale deed dated 19-12-1953. Since the Petitioner's mother was alive and she was legal and natural guardian of the Petitioner, Adinath had no locus standi to transfer the Petitioner's land to Alakhdeo. The sale deed was void and it did not confer any valid title to Alakhdeo. On behalf of Respondent Alakhdeo, it was urged that Adinath was de facto guardian of the Petitioner, he executed the sale deed for consideration and since the sale deed has not been cancelled by a competent court the same is binding. In the alternative, it was further urged that the sale deed was not a void document, instead it was a voidable document and as such the consolidation authorities have no jurisdiction to cancel or ignore the said sale deed, they are bound to give effect to that sale deed. Further since 1953 Respondent Alakhdeo has continuously been in possession of the land in dispute, he matured his title to the land. It was further urged that the Petitioner's claim for setting aside the sale deed or for regaining possession or title to the land in dispute was barred by time and as such the consolidation authorities rightly rejected the Petitioner's claim.

3. There is no dispute that the sale deed in question was executed by Adinath the uncle of the Petitioner even though his mother, the natural guardian, was alive. In the circumstances, it was always open to the minor on attaining majority to challenge the validity of the sale deed. All the three consolidation authorities have however rejected the Petitioner's claim on the ground that since the Petitioner's right to bring an action for the cancellation of sale deed was barred by time he could not challenge the validity of the sale deed. On the findings recorded by the consolidation authorities it is clear that the Petitioner completed the age of 18 years on 8th January, 1959, he could therefore, file a suit for cancellation of the sale deed and for possession of the land in dispute within the prescribed period of limitation. u/s 209 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, the Petitioner could file suit for ejectment of Respondent Alakhdeo, the transferee under the sale deed executed by Adinath. Under Appendix III to the Rules framed under the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, the period for filing a suit u/s 209 was three years till 26th March, 1959. By a notification dated March 27, 1959, Appendix III to the Rules was amended and the limitation of three years was extended to six years. Consequently a suit for dispossession of a person retaining land unlawfully could be filed within six years after 27