Compliance with the requirements of Section 20(4) of the Act before the date of first hearing mentioned in the summons served on the Defendants relieves them of liability for eviction due to default in rent payment.

V.K. Khanna, J.

This writ petition has been filed against an order of the V Additional District Judge, Aligarh dated 13-10-1980 allowing the revision filed by Smt. Premwati, landlady, against the decision of the Judge Small Cause Court (Munsif, Hathras) dismissing Plaintiff's suit after holding that Defendants were entitled to benefit, of Section 20(4) of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 (hereinafter referred to as Act).

2. 7 he brief facts for the purposes of deciding present writ petition are that Smt. Premwati, landlady, filed a suit for ejectment and recovery of arrears of rent against six Defendants-tenants (Petitioners and Respondents 2 and 3). It appears that summons of the suit were served on four Defendants i.e. Petitioners. They were served before 23-1-1979. The date of hearing mentioned in the summons served on Petitioners was 24-1-1979. The Petitioners put in appearance and deposited the entire amount of rent due, costs of the suit and interest upto 27-1-1979 on 23-1-1979. The trial court gave benefit of Section 20(4) of the Act to the Defendants-Petitioners on the basis that there had been due compliance of the provisions of the aforesaid Section and thus Plaintiff could not get relief for ejectment on the ground of the Defendants being defaulter in respect of payment of rent despite notice of demand. Feeling aggrieved the landlady Smt. Premwati preferred a revision which has been allowed under the impugned order. The revisional court has held that as there was a joint tenancy and the court could not pass an order decreeing the suit for eviction against some tenants and dismissing the suit against the others, the Defendants were bound to deposit all the costs of the suit even though it was incurred after 23-1-1979.

3. Learned Counsel for the Petitioners has challenged the aforesaid decision given by the revisional court on the ground that as far as the Petitioners are concerned they had according to the findings recorded under the impugned order deposited the entire amount on the first date of hearing and thus they were entitled to benefit of Section 20(4) of the Act.

4. Learned Counsel for the Respondent-landlady has however urged that as the tenancy was joint, the date of first hearing in the suit will be the date on which all the Defendants had been served and not the date of hearing which was mentioned in the summons served on the Petitioners.

5. Section 20(4) of the Act clearly specifies in the Explanation added by U.P. Act No. 28 of 1976 that for the purposes of this Sub-section the expression first hearing' means the first date for any steps or proceedings mentioned in the summons served on the Defendants. It has not been disputed before me that as far as the Petitioners are concerned they had deposited the entire amount of rent due, costs and interest as contemplated by Section 20(4) of the Act before the date of hearing mentioned in the summons served on them. The suit by the Plaintiff has been filed against the four Petitioners and two Respondents and each of these Defendants were entitled to avail benefit of Section 20(4) of the Act. Any deposit which would have been made by any of the Defendants under the aforesaid Section would have been made for the benefit of all the Defendants, AS far as the Petitioners are concerned the summons served on them mentioned the date of hearing and that would be the date which would be treated as the date of first hearing. The Petitioners had duly complied with the requirements of Section 20(4) of the Act before the date of first hearing intimated to them by summons. No decree could thus be passed for eviction of the Defendants on the ground that they were defaulters in payment of rent. The view taken by the revisional court under the impugned order that to avail benefit of Section 20(4) of the Act the Defendants had also to deposit the costs incurred after the first date of hearing intimated to them is patently erroneous. The first date of hearing would not be changed fo