An employee's right to occupy premises provided by the employer is dependent on the employment relationship. Once the employment relationship is terminated, the employee has no right to continue occupying the premises.

Ravi S. Dhavan, J.

The Petitioner was an employee of the State Bank of Patiala and thus, was permitted as part of his conditions of service to occupy a flat owned by Smt. Swaraj Devi, Respondent No. 1 to occupy the third floor of the premises at 10 Navyug Market, Ghaziabad. As the premises in question were leased to the State Bank of Patiala, the Petitioner's status in it was as an employee of the Bank

2. Unfortunately, the Petitioner was suspended from service. Ultimately his services were terminated by the Bank and consequently, the Petitioner was on his own, in his occupation of the premises as the Bank would not accept him as it's employee.

3. The landlady filed a suit before the Judge Small Causes (District Judge, Ghaziabad) Smt. Swaraj Devi v. State Bank of Patiala and Ram Chandra Rupana. The relief sought in the suit were a decree for possession, arrears of rent and a consequential decree on damages for use and occupation of the premises. A notice u/s 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, by the landlady terminated the tenancy of the Bank and its agents and assignees. The notice was dated 31-12-1982 and the date of expiry of the period under the notice was reckoned as from 31-1-1982.

4. An exparte decree for ejectment was passed by the court below on 6-9-1983. The Petitioner sought to have the exparte decree recalled by an application dated 19-1-1990, a period of almost seven years after the ex parte judgment and decree On the application of the Petitioner seeking recall of the exparte decree, he was saddled with costs at Rs. 500/- by an order dated 30-8-1991 The costs were not paid Thus, the exparte decree became absolute. A subsequent effort to seek recall of the decree as it stands was denied by the court of Judge Small Causes (III Additional District Judge, Ghaziabad) by the order dated 25-9-1991. This order. annexure 1' to the petition, is challenged in the writ petition. If this order is quashed by a writ of certiorari the Petitioner will contest the suit on merits after eight years.

5. This Court has heard learned Counsel for the Petitioner at length, and has farther perused the record of the writ petition. If substantial justice is to be done, the court is not inclined to grant indulgence to the Petitioner to reopen the case after eight years for the purposes of filing his written statement and confront the landlady in a matter of tenancy, which the Petitioner claims, but under the law may not be available to him.

6. After all, the question does arise on what is the status of the Petitioner in the premises today. He occupied the premises as an officer of the Bank. The contract for occupying the premises was with the Bank, and should the Petitioner not be an officer of the Bank, he would not be in the premises. The fact that the Bank has terminated the Petitioner's services or that a case may be pending in which the Petitioner may have challenged his order of termination will permit him no immunity in claiming his status in the premises in dispute as the landlady is not to be involved on what happens, to the master and servant relationship between the Bank and the Petitioner. The submission to the effect that the Petitioner's status will depend upon the result of the litigation against the Bank, would be inequitable upon the landlady, if the Bank were not to pay her rent against the use and occupation of these premises treating the Petitioner as a dismissed employee.

7. In these circumstances upon a writ of certiorari, the court feels that the Petitioner cannot continue in the premises as a representative of the Bank and to that extent he cannot contest the matter in his individual capacity and without the Bank. Thus, if an exparte decree were to be set aside today after eight years it would cause injustice to the landlady and would further create complication for the Bank also as it should have to find an equation with the Petitioner, which it treats as having been severed .

8. Thus, this is not a case in which