The main legal point established in the judgment is that the provisions of Section 125 of Cr.P.C. and Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act should be allowed to co-exist and be treated as complementary to each other, rather than mutually exclusive.

JUDGMENT :

KARUNA NAND BAJPAYEE, J.

1. This application u/s 482 of Cr.P.C. has been moved seeking the quashing of impugned order dated 29.11.2018 passed by the Principal Judge, Family Court, Azamgarh in Case No.787 of 2016 (Smt. Shashikala Yadav vs. Amarnath Yadav) u/s 125 of Cr.P.C., Police Station-Tahbarpur, District-Azamgarh, whereby Rs.1500/- per month has been awarded to the wife- opposite party no.2 as interim maintenance.

2. Heard learned counsel for the applicant.

3. Submission of learned counsel for the applicant is that the allegedly neglected wife has already availed remedy under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act and she is already getting Rs.2,000/- per month as interim maintenance amount. In that view of the matter, the fixation of the interim maintenance amount in the present proceedings, which are going on under Section 125 Cr.P.C., is bad in the eyes of law. In this regard reference was given by the counsel to the case of Patna Improvement Trust vs. Lakshmi Devi, (1963) AIR SC 1077. It has also been submitted by the counsel that the factum of the relief which has already been granted under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act was never considered by the court below while fixing the amount of interim maintenance in the present case.

4. Heard learned A.G.A. and perused the record.

5. So far as the case law relied upon by the counsel for the applicant is concerned, attention of the Court was specifically drawn to the observation made by the Supreme Court in Para-12 of the aforesaid case Patna Improvement Trust vs. Lakshmi Devi, (1963) AIR SC 1077 and on the basis of the same it was sought to be argued by the counsel for the applicant that the general law must yield place to the specific law and therefore if the wife was getting her maintenance amount under the Hindu Marriage Act, she would forfeit her right to get any maintenance under the provisions of Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code. It shall be appropriate at this stage to quote para-12 of aforesaid judgment which reads as follows :

"12.The law on the subject is very well settled and, in my view, the learned judges of the High Court have correctly appreciated it and applied it to the facts of the case. Two principles noticed by the High Court are apposite. The first principle is generalia specialibus non derogant. This principle is exemplified by the decision of the Privy Council in Secretary of State v. Hindustan Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd. (1). The second principle is that if a statute directs a thing be done in a certain wax that thing shall not, even if there be no negative words,, be done in-any other way. This principle is illustrated by the decision in Ex parte Stephens (2). A combined effect of the said two principles may be stated thus : a general Act must yield to a special Act dealing with a specific subject- matter and that if an Act directs a thing to be done in a particular way, it shall be deemed to have prohibited the doing of that thing in any other way. Under the Act, the Trust is authorized to implement the improvement schemes in a particular way and for the purposes of implementing them to acquire land in a prescribed manner. If that be so, the Trust is bound to implement the scheme in the manner prescribed and cannot resort to any other method, that is to say it can acquire land for trust purposes only by resorting to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Land as modified and incorporated by reference in the Act."

6. So far as the observations of the Apex Court made in aforesaid paragraph is concerned, this Court finds it difficult to bring them into application in the facts and circumstances of this case. The propositions of law as have been referred to and observed by the Hon'ble Apex court are with regard to the situations where there is some general law and then some specific law with regard to the same has been enacted. It is difficult to accept the contention of the counsel that Section-24 of the Hindu Marriage Act is a