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2019 Supreme(All) 1584

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Pritinker Diwaker, Raj Beer Singh, JJ.
Jagdish - Appellant
Vs.
State Of U.P. - Respondent
Criminal Appeal No. 56 of 1989
Decided On : 25-09-2019

Advocates Appeared:
N.I. Jafri, Adv., Mohd Asif, Adv., Amit Sinha, Adv.

The main legal point established in the judgment is the application of Exception 4 to Section 300 of IPC, which covers acts done in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel. The court's decision was influenced by the interpretation of this legal provision, determining the liability of the appellant for 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder' under Section 304 Part II of IPC.

Headnote:

IPC - Murder - Section 302, Section 304 Part II - Section 300 of IPC - Exception 4 - Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC applies in the absence of any premeditation. The exception contemplates that the sudden fight shall start upon the heat of passion on a sudden quarrel. The fourth exception to Section 300 IPC covers acts done in a sudden fight. The said Exception deals with a case of provocation not covered by the first exception, after which its place would have been more appropriate. The Exception is founded upon the same principle, for in both there is absence of premeditation. But, while in the case of Exception 1 there is total deprivation of self-control, in case of Exception 4, there is only that heat of passion which clouds men's sober reason and urges them to deeds which they would not otherwise do. There is provocation in Exception 4 as in Exception 1, but the injury done is not the direct consequence of that provocation. In fact, Exception 4 deals with cases in which notwithstanding that a blow may have been struck, or some provocation given in the origin of the dispute or in whatever way the quarrel may have originated, yet the subsequent conduct of both parties puts them in respect of guilt upon an equal footing. A "sudden fight" implies mutual provocation and blows on each side. The homicide committed is then clearly not traceable to unilateral provocation, nor could in such cases the whole blame be placed on one side. For if it were so, the Exception more appropriately applicable would be Exception 1. There is no previous deliberation or determination to fight. A fight suddenly takes place, for which both parties are more or less to be blamed. It may be that one of them starts it, but if the other had not aggravated it by his own conduct it would not have taken the serious turn it did. There is then mutual provocation and aggravation, and it is difficult to apportion the share of blame which attaches to each fighter. The help of Exception 4 can be invoked if death is caused (a) without premeditation, (b) in a sudden fight, (c) without the offenders having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner, and (d) the fight must have been with the person killed. To bring a case within Exception 4 all the ingredients mentioned in it must be found. It is to be noted that the "fight" occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC is not defined in IPC. It takes two to make a fight. Heat of passion requires that there must be no time for the passions to cool down and in this case, the parties had worked themselves into a fury on account of the verbal altercation in the beginning. A fight is a combat between two and more persons whether with or without weapons. It is not possible to enunciate any general rule as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is a question of fact and whether a quarrel is sudden or not must necessarily depend upon the proved facts of each case. For the application of Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that there was a sudden quarrel and there was no premeditation. It must further be shown that the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. The expression "undue advantage" as used in the provision means "unfair advantage".

Fact of the Case:

The appellant Jagdish was convicted under Section 302 of IPC for causing the death of the deceased Jaipal Singh during a sudden fight that arose over a dispute regarding agricultural fields. The appellant and the deceased had a verbal altercation, leading to the appellant causing a fatal injury to the deceased with a spear. The appellant appealed the conviction, arguing that the act did not amount to murder and should be considered under Section 304 Part I or 304 Part II of IPC.

Finding of the Court:

The court found that the appellant's act fell within Exception 4 of Section 300 of IPC, as it was a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel, and the appellant had not taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. Therefore, the court held that the appellant was liable to be convicted for committing 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder' under Section 304 Part II of IPC.

Issues: The issues involved in the case were whether the appellant's act constituted murder under Section 302 of IPC or 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder' under Section 304 Part II of IPC, and whether the appellant had taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner during the altercation.

Ratio Decidendi: The court applied the principles of Exception 4 to Section 300 of IPC, which covers acts done in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel. It emphasized that for the application of Exception 4, it must be shown that the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. The court found that the appellant's act met the criteria of Exception 4 and therefore, held him liable for 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder' under Section 304 Part II of IPC.

Final Decision: The court partly allowed the appeal and convicted the appellant under Section 304 Part II of IPC, imposing a jail sentence of 5 years. Additionally, the appellant was directed to pay compensation of Rs. 2,00,000 to the wife of the deceased, with a directive to deposit the amount within two years before the trial court. Failure to do so would result in further jail sentence of one year.

JUDGMENT :

Pritinker Diwaker, J.

This appeal arises out of the impugned judgement and order dated 09.01.1989 passed by IInd Additional Sessions Judge, Bulandshahr in Sessions Trial No. 781 of 1987 (State Vs. Jagdish and Others), convicting the accused-appellant no. 1 Jagdish under Section 302 of IPC and sentencing him to undergo imprisonment for life.

2. In the present case, name of the deceased is Jaipal Singh. The appellant Jagdish and deceased Jaipal Singh were having adjacent agricultural fields and there was some dispute between them regarding the bund/boundary of the same. It is further not disputed that in the village in question, there were number of blue bulls and quite often they used to damage the standing crops of the agriculturists. On 20.08.1987 at about 07.00 am, when the complainant party including Jaipal Singh were working in their agricultural field, accused-appellant Jagdish and other accused persons namely Dharampal Giri, Murti Giri, Mantoori Giri, Vinod Giri and Govind Giri reached there. There was some hot talks between them and accused-appellant Jagdish levelled allegations against the complainant-party that they have removed the fencing of the field as a result of which blue bulls have damaged his field. Both the parties abused each other and it was objected by the deceased Jaipal Singh and it is said that during this, accused-appellant Jagdish gave a blow of spear near the neck of the deceased. The other accused persons also assaulted the complainant party by a club. Number of villagers reached there and then it was noticed that after sustaining injury, Jaipal Singh had expired. On 20.08.1987 itself, at 10.35 am, on the basis of written report Ex.Ka.3, lodged by Kanchhid Singh (nephew of the deceased, not examined), FIR, Ex.Ka.4 was registered against the accused-persons under Sections 147,148,302,307 of I.P.C. Injured Gopichand (PW-3) was medically examined vide Ex.Ka.2 on 20.08.1987 by Dr. Jagpal Singh (PW-5) and the following two injuries were found on his body:

"(i) stab wound elliptical 2 x .3 cm x 1.5 cm deep on face right side with the parallel of jaw of mandible 4 cm right of centre of chin. Margins of the wound sharp.

(ii) stab wound with sharp margins over right side of neck 4 cm above from nose. Size .5 x .3 cm x 1.5 cm deep elliptical. Traumatic swelling over neck right side 10 x 8 cm."

3. Inquest on the dead body of the deceased was conducted vide Ex.Ka.6 on 20.08.1987 and the body was sent for postmortem, which was conducted by Dr. R.K. Lal vide Ex.Ka.1 on 21.08.1987.

4. Autopsy Surgeon has found following single injury on the body of the deceased:

"1. Punctured wound (incised) on neck Rt. side 1 cm x = cm direction towards left and back 1 cm above right clavicle medial end, depth 3 cm transverse"

5. The cause of death of the deceased was due to shock and haemorrhage as a result of antemortem injury.

6. While framing charge, the trial Judge has framed charge against the accused-appellant Jagdish under Sections 148,302,307/149,323/149 of I.P.C., against accused Dharampal, charge was framed under Section 148,302/149,307/149, whereas against rest of the accused persons, charges were framed under Sections 147,302/149,307/149,323/149 of I.P.C.

7. So as to hold the accused-persons guilty, prosecution has examined seven witnesses. Statements of the accused-persons were also recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. in which, they pleaded their innocence and false implication.

8. By the impugned judgment, the trial Judge has convicted accused-appellant Jagdish as mentioned in paragraph no. 1 of this judgment, whereas accused Dharampal was convicted under Section 307 of I.P.C. The other accused-persons have been acquitted by the trial judge. During the pendency of present appeal, accused Dharampal has expired and, therefore, appeal in his respect is dismissed as having become abated. The present appeal confines only in respect of accused-appellant Jagdish.

9. Learned counsel for the appellant submits:

(i) that FIR is

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