Point of Law: Mere fact that petitioner's name was not mutated in the revenue record cannot be held to be a conclusive evidence for disbelieving registered instrument of transfer particularly when it is settled law that revenue entries do not pertain to proof of title and are merely a document to indicate possession of the property and that too only for the purposes of payment of revenue to State.

JUDGMENT :

MANISH MATHUR, J.

1. Heard Mr. V.K. Pandey, learned counsel for petitioner and learned State Counsel appearing on behalf of opposite parties.

2. Petition has been filed assailing the order dated 09.12.1991 passed by the Prescribed Authority Ceiling as well as Appellate Court Order dated 31.10.1995, whereby certain portion of petitioner's holdings have been held to be surplus in view of provisions of U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960.

3. Learned counsel for petitioner submits that petitioner had purchased the property in question recorded as Gata No. 277/39, measuring area 4.51, total area 12.50 of village Gajraura, Pargana Palia, Tahsil Nighasan, District Kheri by means of registered sale-deed dated 02.04.1971 and has been continuously in possession of the aforesaid land till passing of the impugned orders. It is submitted that although the said sale-deed is subsequent to the cut off date of 24.01.1971 as amended to 08.06.1973 by means of amending Act, 1972 but the authorities below have failed to consider the specific provisions of Section 5(6)(b) of the Act, 1960 and have reached incorrect conclusion regarding the sale-deed having been executed in good faith and for adequate consideration under an irrevocable deed for consideration which was not Benami transaction. It is submitted that the authorities have misdirected themselves by disbelieving the registered sale-deed only on the basis that petitioner's name was not mutated in the revenue records in pursuance to the sale-deed. Learned counsel has further submitted that during proceedings petitioner had produced witnesses not only to prove the sale-deed but also to prove her possession over the property in question but the same was wrongly disbelieved merely on the ground that petitioner did not produce herself in the proceedings to prove either the sale-deed or her possession over the property.

4. Learned counsel has placed reliance on certain judgments of this Court in order to buttress his submissions.

5. Learned State Counsel appearing on behalf of opposite parties, on the basis of counter affidavit filed, submits that subjective satisfaction has been recorded by the authorities below for disbelieving the sale-deed on which petitioner has placed reliance. It is submitted that the authorities have correctly recorded the finding that petitioner is not in possession over the property in question particularly in view of the subsequent power of attorney executed by petitioner in favour of one Chandrika Prasad. It is submitted that the order clearly records the fact that the witnesses produced on behalf of petitioner were also unaware with regard to the place of residence of petitioner's husband. It is further submitted that in terms of Section 5(6)(b) of the Act, it is the satisfaction of Prescribed Authority to believe or disbelieve the sale-deed executed after the cut off date and such a discretion of the authority does not warrant any interference in writ petition.

6. Considering the submissions advanced by learned counsel for parties and upon perusal of material on record, it is apparent and admitted that the sale-deed said to have been executed in favour of petitioner is subsequent to the cut off date indicated in the Act as 24.01.1971. The Prescribed Authority as well as the Appellate Authority have placed considerable emphasis on the fact that that petitioner did not appear before the authorities either in order to prove the sale-deed or even her possession over the property in question. The witnesses produced on behalf of petitioner have also been disbelieved primarily on the ground that they were not witnesses to the sale-deed and even otherwise were unaware of the place of residence of petitioner's husband. As such it has been held that the sale-deed which forms the basis of petitioner's claim was not a bona-fide document executed in good faith.

7. With regard to aforesaid factors regarding deed of transfer executed after the cut off date of 2