Advocates Appeared:
For the Appellant : Vinayak Mithal.
For the Respondent: Kartikeya Saran.

Based on the provided legal document, the key points are as follows:

1. Nature of the LOI: The Letter of Intent (LOI) was not a concluded or binding contract but a preliminary document indicating the parties' intention to enter into a future full contract, subject to fulfillment of certain conditions, notably the "condition precedent" of formal signing by a specified date (!) (!) (!) . The LOI explicitly stated it would be superseded by a detailed contract once the outstanding terms were agreed upon.

2. Effect of Extensions: The LOI was extended twice, with the second extension valid until 31.05.2022, but all extensions maintained that the LOI's other terms remained unchanged and that it was contingent upon the fulfillment of the condition precedent. The parties continued negotiations post-LOI, but no final agreement was reached before the LOI was declared null and void (!) (!) .

3. Material Terms and Negotiations: The negotiations involved numerous open issues, including mobilization costs, payment schedules, and other contractual deviations. Despite efforts, the parties failed to reach consensus on these material terms, indicating that no binding agreement had been formed through correspondence or meetings beyond the LOI (!) (!) .

4. Status of the Contract with Third Parties: The respondent entered into a contract with a third party before the LOI was declared null and void. The validity of this subsequent contract is separate from the LOI, which was not a concluded or enforceable agreement, and the third-party contract was not challenged in the proceedings (!) (!) .

5. Alleged Fraud and Malafide Conduct: The appellant claimed that the respondent acted fraudulently by declaring the LOI null and void while negotiations were ongoing and that the respondent was simultaneously negotiating with a third party to circumvent the LOI. However, the evidence did not substantiate that the LOI was a concluded contract or that there was any fraudulent intent sufficient to justify an injunction (!) (!) .

6. Maintenance of the Application under Section 9: The court observed that since the LOI was not a binding contract and was declared null and void, and because a contract with a third party was already executed, the application for interim relief under Section 9 was not maintainable. The court emphasized that the remedy for disputes lies in arbitration, and there was no sufficient prima facie case for granting an injunction (!) (!) (!) .

7. Timing and Intention to Arbitrate: The court noted that the applicant's conduct indicated a lack of clear intent to pursue arbitration, especially since the dispute was about a non-binding LOI, and the respondent had already entered into a contractual arrangement with a third party. The timing of the application and the subsequent contractual actions indicated that the application under Section 9 was not appropriate in this context (!) (!) .

8. Conclusion: The court dismissed the appeal, reaffirming that no binding contract existed between the parties at the relevant time, and the dispute was more appropriately resolved through arbitration. The application for interim relief was held to lack merit, and the respondent's actions did not constitute fraud justifying an injunction (!) .

In summary, the court's findings hinge on the contractual nature of the LOI, the ongoing negotiations, the absence of a concluded agreement, and the availability of arbitration as the proper remedy. The evidence did not support the existence of a binding contract or fraudulent conduct warranting injunctive relief.