JUDGMENT

1. This is an appeal against an order of the First Additional Subordinate Judge of Aligarh, dated the 9th March 1920, holding that an application for restitution u/s 144 of the CPC is time-barred. The litigation out of which the question arises has been a remarkably protracted one. The suit was brought in 1901, and the parties have been to this Court at least five times. The point, however, whish we have to decide is a simple one.

2. The facts and so mush of the history of the case as is relevant are fully stated in the judgment of Mr. Justice Piggott, dated the 17th February 1919 (Execution First Appeal No. 139 of 1918), when a Bench of this High Court, consisting of that learned Judge and one of us, allowed an appeal brought by some strangers to the original suit against an order of restitution which the Subordinate Judge had made on the same application whish it now before us for the second time.

3. The appellants before us, Musammat Hanifunnissa and Musammat Bashirunnissa, were the original judgment debtors in the suit. The decree obtained against them, of whish Bansidhar, the predecessor-in-interest of the present respondents, had become the transferee, was set aside and the suit finally dismissed by this High Court, as the result of a prior order made by their Lordships of the Privy Council, by an order, dated the 8th May 1912.

4. The decree against them having been set aside, the appellants acquired on that date, 8th May 1912, a clear right to recover back, by an order of restitution made u/s 144 of the Civil Procedure Code, from the decree holder anything which they had paid, delivered up, or lost as the result of the enforcement of the decree. By the judgment of this Court of the 27th February 1919 it was held that the liability to make such restitution attached to Bansidhar. This judgment is binding on the parties to the appeal before us. It is to be regretted that we were unable finally to dispose of the matter when it was, before us in 1919, but it appears from the judgment of Mr. Justice Piggott that we were not in a position to do this, and we remanded the case for disposal on the points of ret judicata and limitation, whish had been raised but not disposed of in the Court below, The point of res judicata baa been abandoned. The point of limitation has been decided in favour of Bansidhar's representatives. The Article applicable is Article 1-1 of Schedule I of the Limitation Act (IX of 1908), which provides that the application now before us must be made within three years of the time when the right to apply accrues. There is no dispute about this and no question of law, therefore, is raised by the appeal. The question really is one of fact, namely, when was the application, now before us, first made.

5. In our judgment, having regard (a) to the misleading forms issued by the Courts, and if not authorized, at any rate countenanced by them, for the use of litigants in making applications under, Section 144; (b) to the astounding misdescriptions, and embarrassing inaccuracies, as to the status of the parties contained in the written applications made under the section; and (c) to the mistaken terminology adopted in asking for the relief sought, we ought to decide this question of fast as one of substance, and not as one of form only, It is necessary, therefore, to state what happened in this matter between the date of the High Court's decree dismissing the suit in 1912 and the filing of the application now before us in 1917. An application for restitution was made within reasonable time after the High Court's decree, namely, in January 1913, (none of the copy of applications before us bears its real date, but there is no dispute about the date) against Bansidhar and other person, some of whom had obtained under an attachment possession of the money whish had been deposited in Court by the judgment-debtors, and others of whom had purchased property of the judgment-debtors sold under the decree. An order was made