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2026 Supreme(All) 784
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD LUCKNOW BENCH
SHEKHAR B. SARAF, ABDHESH KUMAR CHAUDHARY, JJ.
Rajendra Prasad Singh – Appellant
Versus
M/s Arch Construction through Partner Shri Santosh Kumar Singh – Respondent
Writ (C) No. 10703 of 2025
Decided On : 27-04-2026
For the Appellants : Nirmit Srivastava, Tejas Singh, Aakched Nath
For the Respondents: Ritesh Kumar Srivastava, Alok Kumar Singh
The doctrine of competence-competence obligates an arbitral tribunal to independently adjudicate all jurisdictional issues, including limitation, notwithstanding prima facie observations made by a referral court. The referral court’s role at the appointment stage is strictly limited to verifying the existence of the arbitration agreement.
Headnote:(A) Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Sections 5, 11, 16(2), 16(5), 16(6) - Scope of Arbitral Tribunal’s jurisdiction under Section 16 - Doctrine of competence-competence - Preliminary objection of limitation - Writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India - Interference with interlocutory orders of Tribunals.
(B) Doctrine of Competence-Competence - Arbitral tribunal is mandated by law to rule on its own jurisdiction, including disputes regarding limitation - The arbitrator cannot abdicate this responsibility by relying on the referral court’s prima facie satisfaction of a subsisting dispute. (Para 19, 21, 26)
(C) Role of Referral Court - Following the 2015 amendment, the power of the court under Section 11 of the Act is restricted to examining the existence and validity of the arbitration agreement; it should not conduct detailed inquiries into preliminary questions like limitation, which are to be decided by the tribunal. (Para 28, 34)
(D) Writ Jurisdiction - Interference by the High Court in arbitration proceedings is justified only in exceptional, rare circumstances such as patent lack of inherent jurisdiction or where the order is so perverse that it represents a gross miscarriage of justice or leaves a party remediless due to statutory constraints. (Para 12-14, 24)
Facts of the case:
An application under Section 16 of the Act, challenging the arbitral proceedings as time-barred, was rejected by the arbitrator on the ground that the referral court, by appointing the arbitrator, had already concluded that there was a live and subsisting dispute. The petitioner challenged this order of dismissal through a writ petition, arguing an abdication of jurisdiction by the tribunal.
Findings of Court:
The court found that the tribunal’s refusal to exercise jurisdiction over the limitation issue was a patent error of law. The tribunal erroneously assumed that it was constrained by the referral court’s previous orders, ignoring the statutory mandate that it must rule upon its own jurisdiction independently.
Issues: The primary issues were whether a writ court can intervene in an interlocutory order under Section 16; whether a referral court’s appointment order precludes the arbitrator from deciding limitation; and whether the arbitrator erred by refusing to adjudicate the preliminary jurisdictional objection.
Ratio Decidendi: Under the principle of competence-competence, an arbitral tribunal has a mandatory duty to decide all jurisdictional challenges. The referral court’s scope is confined strictly to the existence and validity of the arbitration agreement. Therefore, the tribunal’s failure to deliberate on the limitation plea constituted an improper surrender of its legal mandate, warranting intervention to ensure the dispute is legally adjudicated.
Result: Writ petition allowed; order of the arbitral tribunal set aside; matter remanded to the tribunal for fresh adjudication on the limitation plea as a preliminary objection.
| Table of Content |
|---|
| 1. procedural history and factual matrix of the dispute. (Para 1 , 2) |
| 2. summary of contentions regarding the scope of section 11 and section 16 of the arbitration act. (Para 3) |
| 3. principles of minimal judicial interference by writ courts in arbitral proceedings. (Para 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 , 10 , 11 , 12 , 13 , 14) |
| 4. tribunal's duty to determine jurisdictional questions, including limitation, under the doctrine of competence-competence. (Para 15 , 16 , 17 , 18 , 19 , 20 , 21 , 22 , 23 , 24 , 25 , 26 , 27 , 28 , 29 , 30 , 31 , 32) |
| 5. the referral court is confined to examining the existence of an arbitration agreement; all other jurisdictional issues must be decided by the arbitral tribunal. (Para 33 , 34 , 35 , 36 , 37 , 38 , 39 , 40) |
JUDGMENT :
SHEKHAR B. SARAF, J.
1. This is a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the issuance of a writ of certiorari seeking quashing of the order dated October 9, 2025, passed by a Sole arbitrator (hereinafter also referred to as the ‘Arbitral Tribunal/respondent no.3’) whereby the application filed by the petitioner under Section 16 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) seeking termination of arbitration proceedings was rejected by Arbitral Tribunal on the ground that once the High Court had appointed an arbitrator under the provisions of Section 11 of the Act, the Arbitral Tribunal had no jurisdiction to adjudicate on the limitation aspect for appointing such arbitrator. In furtherance, the petitioner prays for the issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari terminating the entire arbitration proceedings pending before the Arbitral Tribunal.
FACTS
2. Factual matrix giving rise to this instant petition is delineated below:
a. The petitioner and Santosh Kumar Singh (hereinafter referred to as ‘respondent no. 2’) entered into a partnership deed dated September 13, 2013 to carry on business in the name of M/s. Arch Construction. Subsequently, an altercation arose between the petitioner and respondent no. 2 regarding payment in furtherance of work carried out for the Power Grid Corporation of India Limited. In this regard, the petitioner wrote a letter dated November 7, 2015, to ICICI bank informing it of the illegal operation of the account by the respondent no. 2, pursuant to which the aforesaid account in ICICI Bank bearing account no. 066605000653 was frozen by the bank.
b. The petitioner alleges that thereafter respondent no.2 opened another account in the name of Arch Construction in Union Bank of India, Narai Bandh Branch, Mau bearing account no. 4338010042423, by forging the signature of his father, petitioner and Ajay Singh (hereinafter referred to as ‘respondent no.4’). An application was also made before the Power Grid Corporation to release the payments for the work into the aforesaid account. The petitioner later discovered that the Power Grid Corporation of India Ltd. had made payment of the outstanding amounts into the accounts provided by respondent no.2.
c. Aggrieved by the aforesaid circumstances, the petitioner lodged an FIR No. 0620 of 2017 under Sections 406, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 against respondent no.2. Subsequently, the Investigating Officer filed a charge-sheet against respondent no.2 under sections 420 and 406 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (corresponding to Section 318 and Section 316 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS)). Pursuant thereto, respondent no.2 was arrested by the police.
d. Respondent no.2 had also issued security cheques of the due amounts to the petitioner, however, the same were dishonoured and as a result the petitioner filed a Complaint Case number 10531 of 2018 on December 17, 2018 before the Competent Court, Lucknow.
e. In the meantime, respondent no.2 sent a legal notice dated September 4, 2017 to the petitioner invoking arbitration clause to which the petitioner replied vide letter dated September 10, 2017 advising respondent
