Back
2025 Supreme(All) 3800
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
NAND PRABHA SHUKLA, J.
Mohd. Idris and Another – Appellants
Versus
State of U.P. – Respondent
Criminal Appeal No. 1964 of 1984
Decided On : 15-12-2025
For the Appellants : Ankit Singh, Sarvesh
Sentencing authorities have a mandatory duty to consider granting probation of good conduct or admonition under relevant penal provisions. Courts must prioritize the reformative objective of criminal justice over incarceration, particularly when criminal proceedings are delayed and the offender lacks prior criminal antecedents.
Headnote:(A) Penal Laws - Sentencing - Reformatory and correctional objectives - Need to consider beneficial legislation - Duty to record reasons - Failure to exercise discretion in invoking probation provisions constitutes a departure from sentencing mandates. (Paras 7-9, 12, 13)
(B) Sentencing - Judicial discretion - Factors relevant for determination include offender's age, character, social background, nature of offence, and trial duration. Sentencing is a sensitive exercise rather than a mechanic task; Courts must demonstrate an activist approach toward rehabilitation. (Paras 9, 12, 15)
(C) Appeal - Appellate Court powers - Appellate forums are empowered to intervene and apply probation benefits if trial courts fail to fulfill their statutory obligations regarding reformatory sentencing. (Paras 8, 15)
Facts of the case:
Appellants were convicted for offences related to rioting, causing hurt, and house trespass for an incident occurring decades ago. The trial court imposed sentences of imprisonment without evaluating the applicability of reformatory probation benefits. The appeals process highlighted the long passage of time since the occurrence and the lack of any subsequent criminal antecedents for the individuals involved.
Findings of Court:
The sentencing court must act as a balance between the gravity of an offence and the potential for reforming the individual. The omission to consider beneficial legislation intended to prevent incarceration for non-serious or first-time offenders constitutes a failure in judicial duty. The court found that in view of the significant passage of time since the incident and the absence of any further criminal behavior, the interest of justice would be better served by reformatory treatment rather than imprisonment.
Issues: The main issues addressed were whether the sentencing courts failed in their mandatory duty to apply beneficial legislation regarding probation and whether the appellate court could exercise its discretion to modify the sentencing after a protracted litigation period.
Ratio Decidendi: Sentencing requires a sensitive exercise of discretion that prioritizes the reformatory mission of criminal law. Where statutes provide for probation, trial and appellate courts are obligated to record specific reasons for choosing imprisonment over reformatory orders. Failure to consider these provisions in cases involving non-life-threatening offences and offenders without prior antecedents is an error that warrants appellate intervention to ensure justice aligns with the rehabilitative goals of the state.
Result: Appeal partly allowed; conviction maintained, sentence modified to release on probation upon executing bonds.
| Table of Content |
|---|
| 1. overview of judicial history and conviction details. (Para 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5) |
| 2. reformatory sentencing through probation and crpc provisions. (Para 6 , 7 , 8 , 9) |
| 3. application of precedent regarding probation in serious cases. (Para 10 , 11 , 12 , 13 , 14 , 15 , 16 , 17 , 18) |
| 4. reasoning for probation due to time lapse and clean records. (Para 19 , 20) |
| 5. final order modifying sentence to probation and bond requirements. (Para 21 , 22 , 23 , 24) |
JUDGMENT :
NAND PRABHA SHUKLA, J.
1. Heard Sri Pramod Kumar, Advocate holding brief of Sri Sarvesh, learned counsel for the appellants, learned A.G.A. for the State and perused the record.
2. This appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order dated 21.07.1984 passed by VIII Additional Sessions Judge, Kanpur convicting and sentencing the appellants to 6 months R.I. under Section 148 of Indian Penal Code and 1 year R.I. and a fine of Rs. 250/- for the offence under Section 325/149 of Indian Penal Code and one year R.I. under Section 452 IPC and three months' R.I. in default of payment of fine.
3. Today, the present Criminal Appeal is listed under the category of oldest pending cases in this High Court for priority basis.
4. As per the office report dated 12.12.2025, notice has been served upon the appellant No. 1 Mohd. Idrees and appellant No. 2 Nooruddin through legal heirs.
5. From the perusal of records, it transpires that the appellant No. 1 Mohd. Idrees and appellant No. 2 Nooruddin have been convicted for the offences under Section 148 IPC to undergo 6 months R.I., Section 325/149 IPC to undergo 1 year R.I. and a fine of Rs. 250/- and Section 452 IPC to undergo one year R.I. and three months' R.I. in default of payment of fine.
6. In the case of Subhash Chand & others Vs. State of U.P., 2015 Law Suit (All) 1343 and the judgment passed in Criminal Revision No. 1319 of 1999 (Hargovind & Others vs. State of U.P.) passed by this Court on 11.01.2019. Section 3 of the Probation of Offenders Act reads as follows:
"3. Power of court to release certain offenders after admonition.- When any person is found guilty of having committed an offence punishable under section 379 or section 380 or section 381 or section 404 or section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, (45 of 1860) or any offence punishable with imprisonment for not more than two years, or with fine, or with both, under the Indian Penal Code, or any other law, and no previous conviction is proved against him and the court by which the person is found guilty is of opinion that, having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence, and the character of the offender, it is expedient so to do, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the court may instead of sentencing him to any punishment or releasing him on probation of good conduct under section 4 release him after due admonition.
Explanation.- For the purposes of this section, previous conviction against a person shall include any previous order made against him under this section or section 4."
7. Thus, this was the bounden duty of the learned Trial Court and also the appellate court to consider why they did not proceed to grant the benefit of Probation of Offenders Act. Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act reads as follows:
"4. Power of court to release certain offenders on probation of good conduct.-
(1) When any person is found guilty of having committed an offence not punishable with death or imprisonment for life and the court by which the person is found guilty is of opinion that, having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, it is expedient to release him on probation of good conduct, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the court may, instead of sentencing him at once to any punishment direct that he be released on his entering into a bond, with or without sur
