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2025 Supreme(All) 3993
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD LUCKNOW
SHREE PRAKASH SINGH, J.
C/M, Ram Bharose Maiku Lal Inter College Lko., Thru. Its Manager Srikant Sahu And Another - Petitioners
Versus
State Of U.P. Thru. Addl. Chief Secy. Secondary Edu. Deptt. Lko And Others - Respondents
WRIT - A No. - 13771 of 2025
Decided on : 12-12-2025
For the Petitioner: Vikas Singh, Mahendra Bahadur Singh.
For the Respondent: C.S.C., Hari Prasad Gupta.
A statutory authority reviewing a suspension order acts in a supervisory capacity to assess the prima facie substance of charges; it lacks jurisdiction to determine the veracity of those charges or impose procedural requirements not mandated by governing law.
Headnote:(A) Education Laws - Power of statutory authority to approve suspension - Authority acts in a supervisory capacity - Scope of examination is confined to determining whether charges have prima facie substance - Authority lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the veracity or truthfulness of charges during the initial approval stage. (Paras 14, 16, 21)
(B) Administrative Law - Requirement of reasoned orders - Statutory authority must record brief, clear reasons when exercising power to approve or disapprove a suspension - Absence of recording such reasons constitutes a failure to apply mind and renders the order unsustainable. (Paras 15, 21)
(C) Procedural propriety - Suspension initiation - Imposition of supplementary requirements, such as sub-committee formation or pre-approval of charge-sheets, not prescribed by governing regulations, constitutes an error in the exercise of jurisdiction. (Paras 16, 18, 19)
Facts of the case:
A governing body initiated the suspension of a staff member, which was subsequently disapproved by a district-level education officer. The disapproval was based on the alleged failure to form a sub-committee, failure to provide an approved charge-sheet, and lack of evidence regarding the veracity of the charges. The governing body contested this decision, arguing that the reviewing authority exceeded its jurisdiction by evaluating the merits and validity of charges rather than assessing their prima facie substance.
Findings of Court:
The court determined that the reviewing authority incorrectly identified procedural steps as mandatory when they were not required by law for initiating suspension. The authority failed to record sufficient reasons for reaching its conclusion and overstepped its role by attempting to adjudicate the weight of the evidence rather than merely verifying the sufficiency of the allegations based on statutory criteria.
Issues: Whether the reviewing authority exceeded its scope of supervisory power by examining the proof of charges and enforcing extraneous conditions for the suspension of staff.
Ratio Decidendi: An authority reviewing a suspension decision is strictly restricted to a prima facie examination of charges. It cannot adjudicate the truth or evidence of such charges, as this function is reserved for the subsequent departmental inquiry. Review must comply with specific statutory criteria, and imposing unauthorized procedural requirements violates the prescribed legal framework.
Result: Petition allowed.
| Table of Content |
|---|
| 1. procedural initiation and factual context of the suspension dispute. (Para 1 , 2 , 3 , 4) |
| 2. petitioner asserts dios overstepped supervisory authority in suspension disapproval. (Para 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 , 10 , 11) |
| 3. respondents defend dios findings on evidence and disciplinary procedure compliance. (Para 12 , 13) |
| 4. dios scope is supervisory; cannot evaluate charges' veracity under section 16-g. (Para 14 , 15 , 16 , 17 , 18 , 19 , 20 , 21) |
| 5. quashing of order and remanding matter for fresh, lawful consideration. (Para 22 , 23 , 24 , 25 , 26) |
JUDGMENT :
1. Supplementary affidavit filed by learned counsel for the petitioners and the counter affidavit filed by respondent no. 6, are taken on record.
2. Heard Mr. Mahendra Bahadur Singh and Mr. Vikash Singh, learned counsels for the petitioners, Mr. Hari Prasad Gupta, learned counsel for respondent no. 6, Mr. Brijendra Singh, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for respondent nos. 1 to 4.
3. Since in the instant petition, the pure legal question is involved, therefore, the matter is being decided at the admission stage. Notice to respondent no. 5 is hereby dispensed with.
4. The present writ petition has been filed assailing the order dated 06.10.2025, by which the district Inspector of Schools has disapproved the resolution of Committee of Management for suspension of the services of respondent no. 6.
5. The contention put forth by learned counsel appearing for the petitioner is that earlier, on two occasions also, the District Inspector of Schools had disapproved the suspension order and on the second time, Writ A No. 10304 of 2025 was instituted, challenging such an order of disapproval, wherein, the Court has passed the order on 15.09.2025, which is quoted hereinunder:-
"1. Preliminary objection and counter affidavit filed by Shri Hari Prashad Gupta, Advocate on behalf of respondent No.7 is taken on record.
2. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner states that he does not intend to file any objections/reply to the same as there is only a short question of law involved in the matter.
3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner prays for and is permitted to delete respondents No.5 & 6 from the array of the parties during the course of the day.
4. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner, Shri Ran Vijay Singh, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the respondents-State and Shri Hari Prashad Gupta, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.7.
5. With the consent of the parties, the matter is being decided finally.
6. Under challenge is the order dated 01.07.2025 passed by the District Inspector of Schools, a copy of which is Annexure-1 to the petition, whereby the suspension order of the respondent No.7 dated 30.12.2024 has been disapproved.
7. The short question of law as raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the District Inspector of Schools while passing the order impugned has also gone into the validity of the charges as leveled against the respondent No.7 and has held that said charges were not proved.
8. Argument of the learned cousnel for the petitioners is that power to approve or disapprove an order of suspension is vested in the District Inspector of Schools under sub Section (7) of Section 16-G of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 (hereinafter referred to as 'Act, 1921'). This Court in the case of Committee of Management, D.P.S.N. Inter College, Kanpur & Anr vs State of U.P. & Ors : [2018 (2) ADJ 840] after considering the aforesaid power has held that the D.I.O.S. has to examine the papers so transmitted but would have no right to address on the merits of the charges, but has only to see on, prima facie basis, as to whether charges have any substance.
9. The argument is that even though the D.I.O.S. was fully empowered to either approve or disapprove the order of suspension that had been sent for his approval by the petitioners but by no stretch of imagination or any principle of law, the D.I.O.S. could have gone int
