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2009 Supreme(UK) 361

2009 (2) UAD 369
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Hon’ble Mr. Justice D.K. Jain and Hon’ble Mr. Justice R.M. Lodha
Civil Appeal No. 4962 of 2002
KANDIMALLA RAGHAVAIAH & CO. – Appellant
Versus
NATIONAL INSURANCE CO. & ANR. – Respondent
Decided on : 10.07.2009

For the Appellant : Mr. P.S. Narasimha, Sr.Adv., Mr. A.V. Rao, Mr. Prabhakar Parnam and Mr. Venkateswara Rao Anumolu, Advs.
For the Respondents:Mr. Ajay Kumar Misra, Sr. Adv., Mr. M.K. Dua, Mr. Kishore Rawat, Ms. Anuradha Dubey Mishra, Mr. Vikram and Mr. Himanshu Munshi, Advocates

Headnote:(A) Consumer Protection Act, 1986, Sec. 24-A — Filing of Complaint under — Limitation for purpose of Sec. 24-A of the Act begins to run from the date of arising of cause of action — In instance case cause of action had arisen on 22/23, March 1988 against the insurance company in respect of fire insurance policy — When fire in the godown of the insured took place — Complaint against the insurer for deficiency in service ought to be filed within two years thereof — As such complaint filed on or after 24.10.1997 was clearly barred by time — Dismissal of complaint by the commission — By the impugned order on ground of bar by limitation — Justified.

        (Paras 10 to 15, 18 and19)

       (B) Terms & Expression — 'Cause of Action' — Term "cause of action" is neither defined in the Act nor in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 but is of wide import — It has different meanings in different context, that is when used in the context of territorial jurisdiction or limitation or the accrual of right to sue — Generally, it is described as "bundle of facts", which if proved or admitted entitle the plaintiff to the relief prayed for — "Cause of action" is cause of action which gives occasion for and forms the foundation of the suit — In the context of limitation with reference to a fire insurance policy — Undoubtedly, the date of accrual of cause of action has to be the date on which the fire breaks out. (Para 13)

       ¼v½ miHkksDrk laj{k.k vf/kfu;e] 1986] /kkjk&24A ds vUrxZr f'kdk;r nk;j dh xbZ & /kkjk&24A ds vUrxZr f'kdk;r nk;j djus gsrq fyfeVs'ku okn dk gsrq mRié gksus dh frfFk ls izkjEHk gksrh gS & izLrqr dsl esa okn gsrq fnukad 22@23 ekpZ 1988 dks chek dEiuh ds fo#) Qk;j ba';ksjsUl ikfylh ds lEcU/k esa mRié gqvk Fkk tcfd chfer xksMkmu esa vkx yxh Fkh & chek dEiuh ds fo#) ?kVuk ls nks o"kks± ds Hkhrj gh lsok esa deh ds fy, nkok nk;j fd;k tkuk pkfg, Fkk & bl izdkj fnukad 24-10-1997 dks vFkok blds ckn f'kdk;r nk;j fd;k tkuk Li"Vr;k dkykrhr Fkk & vk;ksx }kjk f'kdk;r dk fujLrhdj.k fyfeVs'ku ds vk/kkj ij ikfjr vkns'k U;k;ksfpr FkkA ¼izLrj 10 ls 15] 18 vkSj 19½

       ¼c½ 'kCnkoyh vkSj vH;qfDr & okn gsrq & 'kCnkoyh dks uk rks vf/kfu;e esa uk gh nhokuh izfd;k lafgrk] 1908 esadgha ij ifjHkkf"kr fd;k x;k ijUrq ;g vR;Ur egRoiw.kZ gS & i`Fkd i`Fkd lanHkZ esa bldk i`Fkd vFkZ fy;k tkrk gS & mnkgj.kkFkZ tc dk;Z{ks= vFkok fyfeVs'ku vFkok okn nk;j djus ds vf/kdkj ds lEcU/k esa iz;qDr fd;k tkrk gS & lkekU;r;k bls ^rF;ksa dk caMy* dgk tkrk gS tks fd fl) gks tkus ij vFkok ;fn Lohdkj gks tk, rks oknh dks mlds }kjk izkfFkZr vuqrks"k ikus dk gdnkj cuk nsrk gS & ^okn gsrq* ml dk;Zokgh ds dk;kZfUor fd;s tkus dk tks visf{kr gS rFkk okn dk vkèkkj cu tkrk gS & Qk;j ba';ksjsUl ikfylh ds lEcU/k esa fyfeVs'ku ds ifjis{; esa fu%lUnsg ^okn gsrq* mRié gksus dh frfFk og gksrh gS ftl frfFk dks vkx yxrh gSA

        ¼izLrj 13½

JUDGMENT

D.K. Jain, J. — Challenge in this Appeal under Section 23 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (‘the Act’, for short) is to a common judgment and order dated 17th April, 2002, passed by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, (“the Commission”, for short) in Original Petitions No. 97 of 1996 and 248 of 1997, whereby the Commission has dismissed appellant’s two complaints alleging deficiency in service against two different insurance companies on account of non-settlement of insurance claims made by the appellant, on the ground that both the complaints were barred by limitation under Section 24A of the Act.

2. The salient facts giving rise to the appeal are as follows :

The appellant firm was engaged in the business of tobacco at Chelakaluripet, Guntur District, Andhra Pradesh. They constructed godowns in the premises of M/s Kandimalla Venkateswarlu at Padripuram, in the same district for storage of tobacco. On 4th December, 1987 the appellant took out a Fire Policy ‘C’ with the National Insurance Company – Respondent No. 1 in this appeal (subject matter of O.P. No. 248 of 1997), in the account of the Indian Bank – Respondent No. 2 herein, against loss or damage by fire etc. for a period of 4 months from 4th December, 1987 to 3rd April, 1988 for a sum of Rs. 1,35,000/- and paid a premium of Rs. 17,634/-. On 8th March, 1988 the appellant obtained loan from Respondent No. 2 Indian Bank by hypothecating the tobacco stored in the godowns. In the intervening night between 22nd and 23rd March, 1988 a fire broke out in the godowns, allegedly due to electrical short circuit and the entire stock of tobacco was gutted. The appellant reported the matter to the present, contesting parties, i.e., both the Insurance Company and the Bank. On 24th March, 1988 a Surveyor was appointed by Respondent No. 1 Insurance Company, who submitted his report on 2nd April, 1988.

3. However, it appears that on 23rd March, 1988 i.e., the date of the incident, Respondent No. 2 the Bank lodged First Information Report (FIR) against the appellant firm and its partners resulting in filing of Criminal Case No. 72 of 1988 against them under Sections 380, 420/423, 436, 457, 484 read with Section 120 (B) of the Indian Penal Coe (IPC), inter alia, alleging that they had intentionally set fire to the tobacco stocks with a view to lay a false claim for loss of stocks. After the trial, the accused were acquitted by the Sessions Judge, Narasaraopet on 22nd August, 1991. Appeal filed by the Bank against order of acquittal was dismissed by the High Court on 5th September, 1992.

4. In the meanwhile, on 14th July, 1988, Respondent No. 2 the Bank preferred a claim (subject matter of the present appeal) with Respondent No. 1 the Insurance Company for an amount of Rs. 1,32,85,760/-. It seems that the Bank did not pursue the claim. On 6th November, 1992, the appellant asked for the claim form from the Insurance Company Respondent No. 1. Having failed to get any response, on 26th October, 1995 issued a legal notice to Respondent No. 1. On 4th January, 1996, the appellant again asked for claim forms but still there was no response. Ultimately, on 21st March 1996 the Insurance Company replied to the legal notice, denying the factum of fire and refused to issue the ‘claim form’ on the ground that the claim had become time-barred.

5. On 21st October, 1997, the appellant filed the complaint before the Commission. Before the Commission, appellant’s case was that they had asked for the ‘claim form’ from the insurance company on 6th November, 1992, which was not given although Respondent No. 2 Bank being a ‘co-insured’ had lodged a claim with the Insurance Company on 14th July, 1988, and they were pursuing their claim with the Insurance Company on behalf of the appellant. Since the denial of the Insurance Company in honouring the claim was received on 21st March 1996, the period of limitation to file complaint would commence from that date and therefore, their compl






































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