The main legal point established is the interpretation of Section 95(2)(a) of the Motor Vehicles Act to determine the liability of the insurance company in paying compensation for a vehicular accident.

B.S. Verma, J.

1. This appeal under Section 110D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (for short the Act) has been preferred against the judgment and order dated 13th February, 1984 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal/District Judge, Tehri Garhwal (in short the Tribunal) in M.A.C. Petition No. 18 of 1983, Smt. Sumitra Devi and Ors. v. Bishamber Nath and Ors. whereby the learned Tribunal awarded compensation of Rs. 87,800 along with interest @ 6% per annum against all the opposite parties and further ordered that respondent No. 3-Insurance Company shall be liable to pay Rs. 50,000 and the O.P.-appellants shall be liable to pay the rest of the compensation amount. Aggrieved, the owner and driver of the vehicle-appellants have come up in appeal before this Court.

2. Relevant facts giving rise to this appeal are that Govind Singh, husband of the claimant Sumitra Devi, aged about 38 years and a mechanic by profession earning Rs. 660 per month as salary from T.I.C.I.L. Simlasu Tehri, lost his life in a vehicular accident, which occurred on 28th July, 1983 at about 12.30 a.m. on Rishikesh-Tehri motor road near Hindola Khal due to rash and negligent driving by the driver of Jeep No. MYE-1416, owned by T.I.C.I.L. and duly insured with United India Insurance Company. Compensation has been claimed to the tune of Rs. 1,67,600 including the amount of Rs. 15,000 on the principle of no fault liability by the dependants and legal representative of the deceased.

3. The owner and driver of the Jeep contested the claim petition by filing their joint written statement. They have admitted the allegations made in the claim petition and in additional pleas, it was asserted that there was no negligence on the part of the driver of the jeep, rather the accident took place due to heavy rains and dense fog at the spot as a result thereof, the jeep fell in the Khad. It was stated that the road was slippery. It was contended that the vehicle was duly insured, therefore, the compensation is payable by the Insurance Company.

4. The Insurance Company-opposite No. 3 filed separate written statement and asserted that the vehicle was comprehensively insured by the Insurance Company towards third party accident and damages to property but it did not cover the passengers, therefore, the insurer is not liable to pay compensation. It was further asserted that the claim ought to have been preferred under the Workmen's Compensation Act as the deceased was a workman. It was asserted that the respondent No. 2 (owner) had already deposited a sum of 21,600 as compensation to be paid to the claimants under the provisions of the aforesaid Act, therefore, claim petition under the Motor Vehicles Act is barred.

5. The learned Tribunal framed necessary issues in the case and after recording the evidence led by the parties and perusing the same, it was concluded that the accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving by the driver of the Jeep in question and it was held that the driver as well as owner of the Jeep were liable to pay compensation. On the point of insurance of the vehicle, the learned Tribunal came to the conclusion that the Insurance Company was liable to pay compensation to its limited liability. It was further held that the deceased was the employee of the owner and he died due to accidental injuries suffered by him, therefore, the case of the deceased was fully covered under the policy conditions. Ultimately, the claim petition was decreed for compensation of Rs. 87,800 with interest @ 6% per annum against the appellants as well as Insurance Company, as mentioned above.

6. In this appeal, the impugned judgment and award has been assailed mainly on the ground that the findings of the learned Tribunal on the point of negligence is erroneous as well as on the liability of the Insurance Company to the extent of Rs. 50,000.

7. I have heard Counsel for the parties and have perused the evidence on record including the lower Court record.

8. It has been vehe