V.K. Gupta, C.J.

By this common judgment, both these petitions are being disposed of together.

2. In both these petitions, mainly and primarily, the orders placing the petitioners under suspension have been challenged. It is the admitted case of the petitioners that the petitioners have straightway approached this Court by invoking this Court's extra-ordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India without having first availed of the alternative remedy of approaching the Uttarakhand State Public Service Tribunal in terms of Section 4 of the U.P. Public Services (Tribunal) Act, 1976 ('1976 Act' for short).

3. At the very threshold, a preliminary objection has been raised by the respondents about the maintainability of these petitions in this Court on the ground that since the petitioners, in both the cases, had the alternative remedy of approaching the Tribunal under Section 4 of 1976 Act and the said alternative remedy being efficacious, these writ petitions may be dismissed on this ground alone and the petitioners be directed to approach the Tribunal

4. The learned counsel for the petitioners, in both the cases, have made two-fold submissions in support of their contention that the writ petitions are maintainable in this Court. Their first contention is that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain a claim petition under Section 4 of 1976 Act with respect to a suspension order. The second submission, which also is in the nature of an alternative submission, is that if it is held that the Tribunal has the jurisdiction to entertain the claim petition under Section 4 with respect to a suspension order, the alternative remedy is not at all efficacious and it is illusory, inasmuch as, in terms of sub-section (5-B) of Section 5 of 1976 Act, the Tribunal has no power as well as the jurisdiction to grant any interim relief with respect to an order of suspension, the petitioners are left with no option but to approach this Court directly by invoking this Court's writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India because the relief claimed by the petitioners cannot be effectively granted to them unless the operation of the suspension orders, in both the cases, is stayed.

5. Sub-section (1) of Section 4 of 1976Act (this sub-section alone, being relevant for our purposes), which deals with the issue of the Tribunal entertaining claim petitions, reads thus:

"4. Reference of claim to Tribunal. - (1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, a person who is or has been a public servant and is aggrieved by an order pertaining to a service matter within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, may make a reference of claim to the Tribunal for the redressal of his grievance."

6. Section 5 of 1976 Act relates to the powers and procedure of the Tribunal and contains various stipulations and provisions with respect to the exercise of the power by the Tribunal in deciding the claim petitions and the various aspects of the procedure to be applied and adopted by it for disposing of such claim petitions. Whereas sub-section (5-A) of Section 5 restrains the Tribunal from granting any interim order except in compliance with the stipulations contained in Clauses (a) and (b) thereof (but, in effect and substance, proviso to Clauses (a) and (b) being read together with these two clauses, clothing the Tribunal with the power of granting interim relief), sub-section (5-8) of Section 5 puts a total embargo and operates as a complete bar with respect to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal in granting any interim relief or passing any interim order, whether by way of injunction or stay, with respect to certain types and categories or orders mentioned therein such as suspension, dismissal, removal etc. etc. In other words, as per sub-section (5-8) supra, the Legislature has completely and clearly prohibited and barred the Tribunal, unequivocally and without any reservation, in granting any interim order with respect to th