The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation and application of Order 40 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure in the context of property disputes and the appointment of a receiver.

The plaintiffs/appellants filed a suit for partition and for accountancy alleging that the plaintiffs had a half share in the suit property. It is alleged that the plaintiff's husband and the defendants were co-owners and that in the suit property, a hotel under the name of Hill Way and a school under the name of North Point was running. Further there were various tenants in various portions of the property which were fetching rent. It is alleged that the defendants were not giving the share of the rent and income to• the plaintiffs and consequently, the suit was instituted.

2. Alongwith the suit the plaintiffs also filed an application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 C.P.C. for grant of a temporary injunction. The plaintiffs also filed an application under Order 40 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure for an appointment of a receiver.

3. Both the applications were resisted by the defendants admitting that the property was ancestral in nature and that the plaintiff's husband had made an oral gift, gifting the land and building to the defendants. This oral gift was subsequently reduced in writing on 1st March, 1991. The defendants further contended that the hotel was being run by the defendants, who had constructed the same from his own funds and that the school was being run by a registered society. Consequently, the plaintiffs are not entitled for any relief.

4. That trial court, after considering the evidence on record, found that a prima facie case was made out by the plaintiffs. The trial court found that the hotel was running since 1982 and the school was running since 1986, and at that point of time, the property was joint and at the stage no oral gift, if any had been executed in favour of the defendants. The trial court, consequently allowed the Injunction application and restrained the defendants from alienating the property during the pendency of the suit. The trial court, however, found that the plaintiffs were not entitled for an appointment of a receiver and consequently, rejected the said application. The plaintiffs, being aggrieved by the rejection of the application for an appointment of a receiver, has flied the present appeal under Order 43 Rule 1 (s) of the Code of CMI Procedure.

5. Hoard Mr. Kanwaljit Singh. the learned counsel for the appellants and Mr. T.S. Bindra the learned counsel for the respondents.

6. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs/appellants submitted that the defendants had taken advantage of the absence of the plaintiffs and her husband, who were residing in Sweden and were, therefore, unable to look after the property and that the defendants have illegally manufactured an oral gift, which cannot be taken into consideration and in any case could not be relied upon since the said oral gift was not registered, and which was compulsory, required to be registered under the Registration Act. In support of his submission, the learned counsel placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Radhakrishan Laxminarayan Toshniwal Vs. Shridhar Ramchandra Alshi and others reported in A.I.R. 1960 S. C. 1358 and in the case of Kumar Gonsusab and others and Mohammed Miyan Urf Baban and others reported in 2008 (73) A.L.R. 496. The learned counsel submitted that the court below found that a prima facie case was made out and found that the property was an ancestral property in which a hotel and a school was being run and that the property was let out to the various tenants. The learned counsel submitted that the trial court in order to protect the property should have appointed a receiver. The learned counsel submitted that it was just and convenient that the trial court should have appointed a receiver and had committed an error in rejecting the application. Learned counsel submitted that the plaintiff is a widow and is in dire need of funds. It was further contended that the property being ancestral, no part of income was being given by the defendants and consequently, it was just and c