Hon’ble U.C. Dhyani, J.

Accused-appellants Amar Singh, Bhagwan Das, Virendra Kumar and Ram Kumar were convicted of the offences punishable under Section 324 of IPC read with Section 34 of IPC and Section 506 (II) of IPC and were sentenced appropriately. Aggrieved against the impugned judgment and order dated 17.10.2003, present criminal appeal was preferred.

2. A Compounding Application No. CRMA 841 of 2013 is filed on behalf of the injured Rampal, Tassabur Hussain, Abrar Hussain, Km. Rita and Afzal Ahmad for permitting them to compound the offences charges against the accused-appellants. The compounding application is duly supported by the affidavits of the injured persons.

3. The injured persons are present in person before this Court, duly identified by their counsel Mr. D.C.S. Rawat, Advocate, who submitted that they are no interested in prosecution of the accused-appellants, in as

much as they have reached an amicable settlement between them with the intervention of some elderly people.

4. The question is whether the injured persons should be permitted to compound the offences punishable under Section 324 read with Section 34 of IPC and Section 506(II) of IPC or not? It may be noted here that the offence punishable under Section 324 of IPC was earlier a compoundable offence but has been subsequently amended and is non-compoundable offence now within the scheme of Section 320 of Cr.P.C.

5. Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Transfer Petition (Criminal) No. 115 of 2012, Dimpey Gujral vs Union Territory through Administrator U.T. Chandigarh and others, [2013 (123) AIC 119 (S.C.) permitted the injured to compound the offence punishable under Section 307 of IPC. The Hon’ble Apex Court relied upon the ruling of Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab and another (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 160, relevant paragraph of which is being reproduced here-in-under for ready reference:

“The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarized thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint of F.I.R. may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim’s family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statues like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the o