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2013 Supreme(UK) 533

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Hon'ble Mr. Justice K.S. Radhakrishnan and
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Pinaki Chandra Ghose
Criminal Appeal No. 2009 of 2013
INDRA SARMA – Appellant
Versus
V.K.V. SARMA – Respondent
Decided on : 26.11.2013

Advocates:
For the Appellant : Mr. Anish Kumar Gupta, learned counsel
For the Respondent: Ms. Jyotika Kalra, learned Amicus Curiae and Mr. Nikhil Majithia, learned counsel

Headnote:(A) Domestic Violence Act, 2005, Sec. 2(f) — Expression — “Relationship in the nature of marriage” — Guidelines for testing under what circumstances, a live-in relationship will fall within — Nature of — Not being exhaustive — Stated. (Para 55)

       (B) Domestic Violence Act, 2005, Sec. 2(f) — Domestic relationship — Definition — Ambit — Appellant being not ignorant of the fact that the respondent was a married person with wife and two children — Hence, was party to an adulterous and bigamous relationship — In the present case, said parties never entertained any intention to rear children — No evidence to show that the parties gave each other mutual support and companionship — No material to show that the parties had ever projected or conducted themselves as husband and wife — No evidence of socialization in public was produced — Also, nothing to show that there was pooling of resources or financial arrangements between them — No joint account was opened or any document was executed in the joint name — No evidence that respondent had caused any harm or injuries or endangered the health, safety, life, limb or well-being, or caused any physical or sexual abuse on the appellant, except that he did not maintain her or continued with the relationship — Held that appellant had entered into this relationship knowing well that the respondent was a married person and had encouraged bigamous relationship — Thereby, she had committed an intentional tort, i.e. interference in the marital relationship with intentionally alienating respondent from his family, i.e. his wife and children — Appellant’s and the respondent’s relationship was therefore, not a “relationship in the nature of marriage” because it had no inherent or essential characteristic of a marriage — But a relationship other than “in the nature of marriage” and the appellant’s status was lower than the status of a wife — And that relationship would not fall within the definition of “domestic relationship” u/s 2(f), D.V. Act. (Paras 63 to 65)

       ¼v½ ?kjsyw fgalk vf/kfu;e] 2005] /kkjk 2(f) & vfHkO;fDr & ßfookg dh izÑfr esa lacaèkÞ & ijh{k.k ds fy, fn’kk&funsZ’k fd fdu ifjfLFkfr;ksa esa ßlkFk esa jgus dk laca/kÞ blds vUrxZr vkrk gS & izÑfr & foLr`r ugha & foojf.krA ¼izLrj 55½

       ¼c½ ?kjsyw fgalk vf/kfu;e] 2005] /kkjk
2(f) & ?kjsyw laca/k & ifjHkk”kk & ifjf/k & vihykFkhZ bl rF; ls vufHkK ugha fd izfroknh ,d fookfgr O;fDr Fkk ftlds nks cPps Fks & blfy, og ,d ijxeu o f}fookg laca/kksa dh i{kdkj Fkh & izLrqr okn esa dfFkr i{kksa dk cPpksa ds ikyu dk vk’; ugha Fkk & dksbZ lk{; ugha fd nksuksa i{k ,d nwljs dks ikjLifjd leFkZu ;k laxr nsrs Fks & dksbZ lk{; ugha fd nksuksa us dHkh ,d nwljs dks ifr&iRuh n’kkZ;k gks & u gh lekt esa lkekftdrk dk dksbZ lk{; Fkk & u gh ;g Li”V fd muds chp lk/ku ds ;k vkfFkZd izca/k Fks & dksbZ lg [kkrk ugha [kksyk x;k Fkk u gh nksuksa ds uke ij dksbZ nLrkost is’k fd;k x;k & dksbZ lk{; ugha fd izfroknh us vihykFkhZ dks fdlh Hkh izdkj ls dksbZ {kfr igq¡pkb gks & /kkfjr fd vihykFkhZ dks ;g Kkr Fkk fd izfroknh ,d fookfgr O;fDr Fkk rc Hkh mlus laca/k cukdj f}fookg laca/k dks c<+kok fn;k Fkk vkSj mlds }kjk lk’k; viÑR; dkfjr Fkk D;ksafd mlus vk’;iwoZd izfroknh ds fookfgr laca/kksa esa gLr{ksi fd;k Fkk o izfroknh dks mldh iRuh o cPpksa ls vU;laØkUr fd;k Fkk vihykFkhZ o izfroknh ds chp laca/k fookg dh izÑfr dk lkFk esa jgus dk laca/k ugha Fkk D;ksafd mlesa fookg dks varfufgZr o vko’;d oSf’k”V~; ugha Fkk vkSj fookg dh izÑfr ls vU; laca/kksa esa vihykFkhZ dk Lrj iRuh ds Lrj ls uhps Fkk & dfFkr laca/k u/s 2(f), ?kjsyw fgalk vf/kfu;e] ?kjsyw laca/k dh ifjHkk”kk esa ugha vkrkA ¼izLrj 63 ls 65½

       

Judgement Key Points

Key Points: - The DV Act defines "domestic relationship" and "relationship in the nature of marriage" and tests for determining such relationships are non-exhaustive and context-specific (!) (!) (!) (!) . - Live-in relationships are not automatically "relationships in the nature of marriage"; the court lays out factors and guidelines to test whether a given live-in relationship possesses essential characteristics of marriage, including duration, shared household, pooling of resources, socialization, intention, and other factors (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) . - In this case, appellant, aware respondent was married with two children, could not be said to have a relationship in the nature of marriage; thus, not protected under DV Act as domestic violence, and maintenance orders were not warranted against the respondent (!) (!) (!) (!) . - The judgment distinguishes between "live-in" and legally recognized marriage, noting the DV Act’s purpose to protect women in domestic relationships and the need for potential legislative amendments for such non-marital relationships (!) (!) . - The Act provides various reliefs (protection, residence, monetary relief, and compensation) but applicability depends on establishing a domestic relationship and the nature of that relationship under Section 2(f) and 3 (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) . - The court referencesGuidelines and tests for determining relationship in the nature of marriage, including duration, shared household, financial arrangements, socialization, and intention, as evolving factors to be weighed in each case (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) . - The judgment reiterates that marriage grants public/legal significance and exclusive duties, while live-in relationships lack such formal recognition and protection under the DV Act in the cited facts (!) (!) (!) (!) .

What is the meaning of "relationship in the nature of marriage" under Section 2(f) of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005?

What are the guidelines to determine whether a live-in relationship falls within a "relationship in the nature of marriage" under DV Act?

What is the status and rights of a person in a live-in relationship where the other party is married, in relation to domestic violence remedies under the DV Act?


JUDGMENT

K.S. Radhakrishnan, J. — Leave granted.

2. Live-in or marriage like relationship is neither a crime nor a sin though socially unacceptable in this country. The decision to marry or not to marry or to have a heterosexual relationship is intensely personal.

3. We are, in this case, concerned with the question whether a “live-in relationship” would amount to a “relationship in the nature of marriage” falling within the definition of “domestic relationship” under Section 2(f) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (for short “the DV Act”) and the disruption of such a relationship by failure to maintain a women involved in such a relationship amounts to “domestic violence” within the meaning of Section 3 of the DV Act.

FACTS:

4. Appellant and respondent were working together in a private company. The Respondent, who was working as a Personal Officer of the Company, was a married person having two children and the appellant, aged 33 years, was unmarried. Constant contacts between them developed intimacy and in the year 1992, appellant left the job from the above-mentioned Company and started living with the respondent in a shared household. Appellant’s family members, including her father, brother and sister, and also the wife of the respondent, opposed that live-in-relationship. She has also maintained the stand that the respondent, in fact, started a business in her name and that they were earning from that business. After some time, the respondent shifted the business to his residence and continued the business with the help of his son, thereby depriving her right of working and earning. Appellant has also stated that both of them lived together in a shared household and, due to their relationship, appellant became pregnant on three occasions, though all resulted in abortion. Respondent, it was alleged, used to force the appellant to take contraceptive methods to avoid pregnancy. Further, it was also stated that the respondent took a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- from the appellant stating that he would buy a land in her name, but the same was not done. Respondent also took money from the appellant to start a beauty parlour for his wife. Appellant also alleged that, during the year 2006, respondent took a loan of Rs.2,50,000/- from her and had not returned. Further, it was also stated that the respondent, all along, was harassing the appellant by not exposing her as his wife publicly, or permitting to suffix his name after the name of the appellant. Appellant also alleged that the respondent never used to take her anywhere, either to the houses of relatives or friends or functions. Appellant also alleged that the respondent never used to accompany her to the hospital or make joint Bank account, execute documents, etc. Respondent’s family constantly opposed their live-in relationship and ultimately forced him to leave the company of the appellant and it was alleged that he left the company of the appellant without maintaining her.

5. Appellant then preferred Criminal Misc. No. 692 of 2007 under Section 12 of the DV Act before the III Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bangalore, seeking the following reliefs:

1) Pass a Protection Order under Section 18 of the DV Act prohibiting the respondent from committing any act of domestic violence against the appellant and her relatives, and further prohibiting the respondent from alienating the assets both moveable and immoveable properties owned by the respondent;

2) Pass a residence order under Section 19 of the DV Act and direct the respondent to provide for an independent residence as being provided by the respondent or in the alternative a joint residence along with the respondent where he is residing presently and for the maintenance of Rs.25,000/- per month regularly as being provided earlier or in the alternative to pay the permanent maintenance charges at the rate of Rs.25,000/- per month for the rest of the life;

3) Pass a monetary order under S

























































































































































































































































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