U.C. Dhyani, J. (Oral)

1. The writ petitioners, by means of present Writ Petition, seek to quash the impugned FIR No. 03 of 2014, under Sections 323, 504, 380 and 457 of IPC, dated 26.06.2014, lodged by respondent no. 3, at Police Station Patwari Circle Danya, District Almora.

2. A first information report was lodged by respondent no.3 against the petitioners for the offences punishable under Sections 323, 504, 380 and 457 of IPC. A compounding application being CRMA No. 1283 of 2014 has been filed by the parties, to indicate that they have buried their differences and have settled their disputes amicably. The compounding application is supported by the affidavits of Naval Singh (petitioner no. 1) and Madan Singh (respondent no. 3) & Baguli Devi (respondent no. 4). Whereas Madan Singh is the informant of the case, Baguli Devi is the victim. Baguli Devi and Madan Singh are present in person, duly identified by their counsel Mr. D. C. S. Rawat, All the petitioners are also present in person, duly identified by their counsel Mr. Yogesh Pacholia. Respondents no. 4 (Baguli Devi) stated that the dispute with the petitioners has been resolved with the intervention of a few elderly persons of the locality. Baguli Devi seeks permission of this Court to compound the offence against the petitioners. She stated that she is not interested in prosecuting the petitioners. In other words, respondent no. 4 (the person aggrieved) has exonerated the present applicants.

3. Whereas offences punishable under Section 504 and 323 of IPC are compoundable offences within the Scheme of Section 320 of Cr. P.C., the other offences are not. The question is– whether the petitioner no. 4 (Baguli Devi) should be permitted to compound the offences complained of against the petitioners or not?

4. Perused the contents of the First information report.

5. Learned counsel for the parties drew the attention of this Court towards the ruling of Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and another, (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 160, in which Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as below:

“The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim’s family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and th