The main legal point established is that an individual serving in a grant-in-aid school with salary paid by the State Government may be considered a 'public servant' under the U.P. Public Services (Tribunal) Act, 1976, and may be barred from filing suits for employment-related matters.

Servesh Kumar Gupta, J.

1. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, it transpires that Mr. Laxmi Chand Sharma, now an octogenarian, joined as an Assistant Teacher (Basic) on 1.7.1956 in some primary school and served up to 31.7.1963. Thereafter, he became the Headmaster and served as such in the same school w.e.f. 1.8.1963 to 31.7.1972. After resigning therefrom, he joined as a C.T. Grade Teacher in B.D. Inter College, Bhagwanpur (Roorkee) w.e.f. 1.8.1972 and served there up till 30.6.1992 when he reached the age of superannuation. Now, he seeks that the services rendered by him in the Basic Primary School w.e.f. 1.7.1956 to 31.7.1972 should also be reckoned for the purpose of calculation of pensionary benefits. With this prayer, he filed the O.S. No.18 of 1997 which firstly was ex parte dismissed by the Trial Court. Appeal No.6 of 2000 filed by Mr. Laxmi Chand, there-against, was allowed and the matter was remanded back to the Civil Court for its adjudication afresh. Thereafter, vide judgment dated 9.7.2007, this suit was decreed by the Civil Judge (Sr. Div.) Roorkee. Civil Appeal No.14 of 2010 filed on behalf of the State of U.P. was allowed and the judgment passed by the Trial Court was overturned. The premise behind allowing such appeal was that the plaintiff Laxmi Chand Sharma was a public servant, as is envisaged u/s 2(b) of the U.P. Public Services (Tribunal) Act, 1976 [hereinafter to be referred as ‘the Act’]. This provision contemplates that a ‘public servant’ means every person in the service or pay of-

(i) the State Government; or

(ii) a local authority not being a Cantonment Board; or

(iii) …………………….

…………………………………………

2. Since the Basic School where the appellant rendered his initial service, was also a grant-in-aid institution and the salary was paid by the State Government with a supervisory control on the same, hence he is covered within the definition of a ‘public servant’. Thus, he could not have filed the Suit, as is barred by Section 6(1) of the Act. Such provision reads as under:-

6. Bar of suits- (1) No suit shall lie against the State Government or any local authority or any statutory corporation or company for any relief in respect of any matter relating to employment at the instance of any person who is or has been a public servant, including a person specified in [clauses (a) to (g)] of sub-section (4) of Section 1.

(2) …………………………………”

3. On the other hand, learned counsel for the appellant has urged that since the grant-in-aid schools are controlled by the private societies and the President and Manager whereof are duly elected by the Members of such Society, hence the appellant cannot be said to be a public servant, rather he is the employee of such society. I am unable to agree with this contention for the reason that even if the Rules are formulated by any such Society for running the school administration, those rules have no value until and unless approved by a competent officer of the State. It is difficult to accept that when the Government is involved in paying the salary of any employee right from Class IV to the Principal, then for the purpose of management of such institution, it may be kept aside. The management can be run by the President/Secretary of the Society but for every material decision, the approval is sought from the State Government. The rules for a public servant as regards their leaves viz. casual, earned, medical, maternity etc. as also pension, the State Government frames the rule which, by and large, are applicable to these employees akin to other public servants who are straightway under the direct control of the State.

4. So, in view of what has been set forth above, I do agree with the view, as adverted by the First Appeal Court, and thus, find no force in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed. Both the substantial questions of law are answered accordingly.

5. However, looking to the plight of the old-age appellant, it is observed that the adjudication of the