U.C. Dhyani, J.

1. The writ petitioners, by means of present Writ Petition, seek to quash the FIR No. 101 of 2016, under Sections 147, 148, 149, 323 and 506 of IPC, lodged by respondent no. 3, at Police Station Nanakmatta, District Udham Singh Nagar.

2. A compounding application being CRMA No. 9669 of 2016 has been filed by the parties, to indicate that they have buried their differences and have settled their disputes amicably. A joint compromise application is also filed by them along with affidavits of Rajendra Singh @ Pali (petitioner no.1), Bhim Singh (complainant/respondent no.3), Arvind Singh (respondent no.6), Anil Singh (respondent no.5), Bijendra Singh Rana (respondent no.4) and Anees (respondent no.7). Respondent nos. 3 to 7 are present in person, duly identified by their counsel Mr. Saurav Kumar Pandey, Advocate. They (respondents no. 3 to 7) say that they have no grievance left against the writ petitioners and they are not interested in prosecuting the petitioners, inasmuch as, the dispute has been settled amicably between the parties with the intervention of some elderly persons of the society. In other words, respondent nos. 3 to 7 have exonerated the present petitioners. All the petitioners are also present in person duly identified by their counsel Ms. Lovely Grover, Advocate.

3. Whereas offences under Section 323 and 506 of IPC are compoundable offences within the Scheme of Section 320 of Cr. P.C., the other offences are not. The question is– whether the respondents no. 3 to 7/persons aggrieved should be permitted to compound the offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 323 and 506 of IPC against the petitioners or not?

4. Learned counsel for the petitioners drew the attention of this Court towards the ruling of Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and another, (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 160, in which Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as below:

“The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim’s family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the