The court emphasized that there cannot be a straight jacket formula for calculating compensation and considered the circumstances and factors concerning the deceased and the claimants.

Servesh Kumar Gupta, J.

Having heard learned Counsel of all concerned, it transpires that both these appeals have arisen out of the same judgment and order dated 22.12.2009, whereby the learned Tribunal while granting the award of Rs. 5,80,000/- odds along with 7 per cent per annum interest from the date of presentation of claim petition, viz. 26.11.2007, has though fastened the liability upon the insurance company, but with a right to recover the same from the vehicle owner Bhupender Singh, who has preferred the AO No. 99/2010 seeking to ward off his liability to reimburse to insurer.

2. On the other hand, claimants, who are the mother, widow and minor children of the deceased, have preferred the AO No. 73/2010 for enhancement of the compensation.

3. I have heard learned Counsels of all concerned and deem it fit to adjudicate both these appeals by way of this single judgment.

4. Accident occurred on 12.9.2007 by truck no. UP10B-6783 when the deceased Gabbar Singh was bicycle ridden. He was dashed by the truck and on account of the injuries suffered by him in such accident, passed away.

5. Learned Counsel on behalf of the claimants has drawn the attention that learned Tribunal while relying on the precedent, as mentioned in paragraph 23 of such judgment, has applied the multiplier of 13 because the deceased was running between the age of 29-30, while as per the Sarla Verma case, in such eventuality, the multiplier of 17 should have been given.

6. I am unable to agree with the above contention for the reason that the precedent of Sarla Verma case is a model laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court which applies usually, but not indiscriminately. It is the settled proposition of such cases laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court a number of times that there cannot be a straight jacket formula for calculating the compensation disregard of other circumstances and the factors concerning the deceased and the claimants. Deceased was an army personnel. Thus, the position of his widow, two children and mother, though dependant, but totally it was not in the nature of helplessness. They must have got a handsome amount and other benefits, which dependants of a Government Servant receive on his death during the tenure of his employment.

7. In this regard, the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Pepsu Road Transport Corporation Vs. National Insurance Company, (2013) 10 SCC 217, and in Bhakra Beas Management Board Vs. Kanta Aggarwal & Others, 2008 ACJ 2371, can be seen of.

8. It has been argued on behalf of Bhupender Singh, the vehicle owner, that at the time of engaging the driver, he had seen the driving license of Mr. Bhura, who was engaged to drive his vehicle and such license was valid on that date to drive the heavy goods vehicle. He was not supposed to rush to the RTO office in order to verify the same before engaging that driver under his employment. In this regard, position has been made clear by the Hon’ble Apex Court in National Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Swaran Singh & Others, (2004) 3 SCC 297, wherein it has been held as under:-

“Under the Act holding of a valid driving license is one of the conditions of the contract of insurance. Driving of a vehicle without a valid license is an offence. Whereas in Section 3 the words used are “effective license”, it has been differently worded in Section 149(2) i.e. “duly licensed”. If a person does not hold an effective license as on the date of the accident, he may be liable for prosecution in terms of Section 141 of the Act but Section 149 pertains to insurance as regards third-party risks. A provision of a statute which is penal in nature vis-à-vis a provision which is beneficent to a third party must be interpreted differently. It is also well known that the expressions contained in different provisions are ordinarily construed differently. The words “effective license” used in Section 3, therefore cannot be imported into Section 149(2) of the Act. Moreover, the words “duly l