IN THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL
NARAYAN SINGH DHANIK, J.
Kuldeep Kumar Khandelwal - Appellant
Versus
Raghunandan Lal Behal & Others - Respondents
Appeal from Order No. 109 of 2018
Decided On : 09-01-2019
Court Fees - Cancellation of Agreement to Sale - Section 7(iv-A) of the Court Fees Act, 1870 - Summary of Acts and Sections: Section 7(iv-A) of the Court Fees Act, 1870 - The court discussed the interpretation and applicability of Section 7(iv-A) of the Act, emphasizing the requirement of ad valorem court fees for cancellation of instruments and decrees. The court also considered relevant judgments from the Hon’ble Apex Court and High Courts to determine the scope and application of the provision.
Fact of the Case:
The plaintiff filed a suit for cancellation of an agreement to sale and challenged the court's decision on the payment of court fees under Section 7(iv-A) of the Court Fees Act, 1870.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the plaintiff was liable to pay ad valorem court fees in accordance with Section 7(iv-A) of the Act for seeking cancellation of the agreement to sale, based on the settled legal position and the interpretation of the provision.
Issues: The main issue revolved around the payment of court fees under Section 7(iv-A) of the Court Fees Act, 1870 for the suit filed for cancellation of the agreement to sale.
Ratio Decidendi: The court's decision was based on the settled legal position and the interpretation of Section 7(iv-A) of the Act, emphasizing the requirement of ad valorem court fees for cancellation of instruments and decrees.
Final Decision: The court dismissed the appeal, upholding the requirement of ad valorem court fees for the suit seeking cancellation of the agreement to sale.
NARAYAN SINGH DHANIK, J.
1. Plaintiff/appellant has preferred this appeal against the order dated 9.3.2018 passed by the Ist Additional Civil Judge (S.D.), Haridwar in O.S. No. 139/2013.
2. Facts, in brief, are that the plaintiff/appellant filed a suit being O.S. No. 139/2013 for cancellation of agreement to sale dated 16.8.2010, wherein the Court below framed issue no. 2 regarding payment of court fees. The Court below vide the impugned order has decided the said issue no. 2 and has held that since the plaintiff has instituted the suit for declaring an instrument/document to be null and void, therefore, the plaintiff is liable to pay the court fees in terms of Section 7 (iv-A) of the Court Fees Act, 1870 (for brevity, hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) and accordingly directed the plaintiff to pay the court fees. Being aggrieved, the plaintiff has filed the present appeal.
3. Heard learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record.
4. For the sake of convenience, Section 7(iv-A) of the Act is reproduced as under:
“For cancellation or adjudging void instruments and decrees.—(iv-A) In suit for or involving cancellation of or adjudging void or voidable a decree for money or other property having a market value, or an instrument securing money or other property having such value :
(1) where the plaintiff or his predecessor-in-title was a party to the decree or the instrument, according to the value of the subject-matter; and
(2) where he or his predecessor-in-title was not a party to the decree or instrument, according to one-fifth of the value of the subject-matter, and such value shall be deemed to be—
if the whole decree or instrument is involved in the suit, the amount for which or value of the property in respect of which the decree was passed or the instrument executed, and if only a part of the decree or instrument is involved in the suit, the amount or value of the property to which such part relates.
Explanation.—The value of the property for the purposes of this sub-section, shall be the market-value, which in the case of immovable property shall be deemed to be the value as computed in accordance with sub-section (v), (v-A) or (v-B), as the case may be.”
5. It is the contention of learned Counsel for the plaintiff/appellant that the plaintiff has filed the suit for cancellation of agreement to sale, and not for cancellation of a sale deed, and he is not seeking possession over any property and, therefore, plaintiff is not liable to pay the ad valorem court fees in terms of Section 7(iv-A) of the Act and the provision of this section does not apply in the present case. Hence, the Court below has wrongly decided the aforementioned issue. In support of his contention, learned Counsel for the plaintiff/appellant cited the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in State of U.P. v. Ramkrishan Burman (through his LRs) & Others, AIR 1971 SC 87. Paragraphs 5 and 6 of the said judgment are reproduced as under:
“5. A decree for declaration of title to money or other property is not a decree for money or other property. In our judgment the expression "decree for money or other property" means only a decree for recovery of money or other property. It does not include a decree concerning title to money or other property.
6. It was urged that in any event the plaintiff had sued for adjudging void or voidable an "instrument" securing money or other property having market value. But a decree in invitum is not an instrument securing money or other property; such a decree is a record of the formal adjudication of the Court relating to a right claimed by a party to a suit. It does not by its own force secure money or property. A consent decree in certain cases may be regarded as an instrument securing money or other property, where the decree proceeds upon a contract which had that effect, but that is only because a consent decree is a record of the contract between the parties to which is super added the seal of the Court. In
Login now and unlock free premium legal research
Login to SupremeToday AI and access free legal analysis, AI highlights, and smart tools.
Login
now!
India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!
Copyright © 2023 Vikas Info Solution Pvt Ltd. All Rights Reserved.