The central legal point established in the judgment is the court's power to quash criminal proceedings or FIR in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction, and the factors to consider when deciding whether to quash criminal proceedings based on compromise between the offender and victim.

JUDGMENT

R.C. Khulbe, J. - Shri Kishore Rai, learned counsel for the petitioner.

2. Shri Rakesh Joshi, learned Brief Holder for the State of Uttarakhand.

3. Shri Mani Kumar, learned counsel for the private respondent.

4. Heard.

5. This petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for quashing the FIR No.11 of 2020 registered at P.S. Kichha (U.S. Nagar) under Sections 323, 324, 504 and 506 of IPC.

6. During pendency of this petition, compounding application (CLMA 7550 of 2020) has been moved on behalf of both the parties, which is identified by their respective counsel.

7. Learned counsel for the State fairly submitted that, although the FIR has been lodged under Section 323, 324, 504 and 506 of IPC, but during investigation, no case is found to have been made out against the petitioners under Section 324 IPC.

8. It is contended by learned counsel for the applicants that the offences punishable under Sections 504 and 506 IPC are compoundable offences while the offence u/s 324 IPC is a non compoundable offence.

9. The Apex Court has dealt with the consequence of a compromise in regard to non-compoundable offences in the case of B.S.Joshi and others vs. State of Haryana and another, (2003) 4 SCC 675 and has held as below: -

"If for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 Cr.P.C. would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is, however, a different matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not such a power."

10. Thus, the High Court, in exercise of its inherent power can quash criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint and Section 320 of Cr.P.C. does not limit or affect the powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has permitted compounding of such offences in the decision of Nikhil Merchant v. CBI and another,2008 9 SCC 650 .

12. Learned counsel for the parties also drew the attention of this Court towards the ruling of Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and another, (2013) 1 SCC(Cri) 160 , in which Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as below:

"The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the f