Compliance with the provisions of Section 6N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act regarding notice and payment of wages in lieu of termination of services is crucial in determining the validity of the termination.

JUDGMENT

Sharad Kumar Sharma, J. - The petitioner is a workman. He had sought a reference for adjudication of an Industrial Disputes under Section 4K of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, by raising his claim before the learned labour Court, as against the order of termination of his services dated 14.08.1989, by preferring the same on 24.10.1990. The said reference, which was sought for adjudication by the petitioner, was numbered as an Adjudication Case No. 171 of 1991, which has been decided by the learned Labour Court by answering the question, referred to against the petitioner/workman, by the impugned award dated 30.06.1995, which is presently under challenge in the present Writ Petition.

2. A very short question, which has been attempted to be established before this Court by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the reference of adjudication, as had been made by the State vide its Govt. Order No. 2513(HI/36) dated 27.08.1990, which was formulated to the following effect:-

3. It was from the pretext that the order of termination of services of the petitioner as a salesman, was bad because of the non-compliance of the provisions contained under Section 6N, of the Industrial Disputes Act, as there was no prior notice ever given to him or the salary in lieu thereof prior to the dispensation of his services w.e.f. 14.08.1989, was tendered by the employer respondent on the petitioner workman.

4. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is from the perspective that, the so-called observations, which has been made in the impugned award, which is under challenge before this Court, where it has been observed and a finding has been recorded, that the employer did issued a notice under Section 6N of the Industrial Disputes Act to the petitioner workman, on 15.07.1989, and in lieu thereof, the receipt of Rs. 1566/- dated 22.10.1989, which was also placed on record by way of evidence, hence, the learned labour Court has observed that the receipt dated 22.10.1989, of accepting the money, as referred therein would amount to be a substantial rather a complete compliance of notice, as it has been contemplated under Section 6N of the Industrial Disputes Act, which was issued to the petitioner. This fact is being attempted to be disputed by the learned petitioner's counsel, on the ground that, the amount remitted to the petitioner in pursuance to the notice dated 15.07.1989, and its receipt dated 22.10.1989, may not be treated to be in strict compliance of the provisions contained under Section 6N of the Industrial Disputes Act.

5. His submission is that, the remittance of an amount, due to be paid in consonance to the notice which was issued or contemplated under Section 6N of the Industrial Disputes Act, cannot be a post-facto, to the act of dispensation of services and, he further submits that the amount which was paid, along with the notice dated 15.07.1989, the receipt of which was placed on record being that of 22.10.1989, he tried to draw a distinction from the view point that it was not an amount, which was due to be paid as a wages, contemplated under Section 6N of the Industrial Disputes Act. But the finding, which has been otherwise recorded by the learned labour Court is, in fact, to the effect that the notice under Section 6N of the Industrial Disputes Act was issued to the petitioner on 15.07.1989, and the receipt on record dated 22.10.1989, was in strict compliance of the provisions contained under Section 6N of the Act, and hence the dispensation of services of the petitioner w.e.f. 14.08.1989, cannot be faulted off, on the pretext, that the same was defective due to non-compliance of the notice under Section 6N of the Industrial Disputes Act.

6. The distinction in the argument, which has been attempted to be raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, pertaining to the effect of the notice, has been refuted by the learned counsel for the respondent Mr. Subhash Upadhyay, on the ground that this disti