The main legal point established in the judgment is the limited scope of scrutiny under Section 47 of the CPC, emphasizing that objections to the executability of a decree can only be entertained if the decree is void ab initio and is a nullity, or if it is not capable of execution under the law.

JUDGMENT

1. Petitioner is challenging the order passed by Executing Court on 14.08.2018. By the said order, Execution Case No. 03 of 2005 filed by the plaintiff/decree holder and Execution Case No. 17 of 2010 filed by the petitioner, were consolidated and writ of possession was issued to the Civil Amin directing him to handover vacant possession of the suit property to the decree holder. The judgment rendered by Revisional Court dismissing petitioner's revision has also been put to challenge in this petition.

2. It is an admitted fact that a suit for partition was filed by Smt. Darshani Devi and several other persons in the year 1980, which was registered as Original Suit No. 61 of 1980; petitioner was defendant in the said suit in which a preliminary decree was passed on 18.12.2018 and thereafter the parties to the suit entered into a compromise on 08.10.1998 and a final decree was prepared in terms of the compromise.

3. It is also not disputed that in the deed of compromise, the entire estate was partitioned and it was settled that parties will mutually exchange possession of the property within six months, failing which possession over the respective shares of the parties will be given to them through court.

4. It is the contention of the petitioner that property, which has come to his share in terms of the compromise deed is possessed by some tenant inducted by the decree holder; petitioner is entitled to vacant possession of his share in the property, therefore, the compromise decree cannot be executed until such tenants are evicted from petitioner's share in the property.

5. This contention of the petitioner was rejected by the Executing Court as well as the Revisional Court, therefore, petitioner has approached this Court.

6. Learned Revisional Court has given cogent reason for rejecting petitioner's revision. It has considered the compromise deed, wherein it has been stated that if possession of the property, in terms of compromise deed, is not handed over by the parties within six months than possession of such property shall be obtained through execution of decree. The Revisional Court has further considered the recital made in the compromise deed regarding possession of other persons over the suit property, where it has been stated that they came to occupy the suit property during pendency of the suit and they have no right to continue in possession over the property.

7. From the stipulation made in the compromise deed, it is apparent that petitioner was aware that part of the suit property, including his share, is possessed by some other persons and despite this knowledge, he entered into compromise without insisting upon eviction of such persons before entering into compromise.

8. Even otherwise also, such persons who came to possess the suit property during pendency of the partition suit are bound by doctrine of lis pendens. Compromise decree cannot be said to be in executable merely because property, which came to petitioner's share is possessed by some persons, who were not party to the suit.

9. Section 47 of CPC, which governs the field, is reproduced as under:-

"47. Questions to be determined by the Court executing decree(1) All questions arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed, or their representatives, and relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree, shall be determined by the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit.

(2) Omitted by Act 104 of 1976

(3) Where a question arises as to whether any person is or is not the representative of a party, such question shall, for the purposes of this section, be determined by the Court. 2

[Explanation 1.For the purposes of this section, a plaintiff whose suit has been dismissed and a defendant against whom a suit has been dismissed are parties to the suit.

Explanation II(a) For the purposes of this section, a purchaser of property at a sale inexecution of a decree shall be deemed to be a party to the suit in which t