JUDGMENT :

Ashish Naithani, J.

1. The present writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the Petitioners assailing the judgment and decree dated 10.10.2013 passed by the Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division), Haridwar in SCC Suit No. 42 of 1995, Panchayati Akhada Nirmala v. Sanjay Kumar and Ors., and the judgment dated 14.07.2023 passed by the 1^st Additional District Judge, Haridwar in SCC Revision No. 38 of 2013.

2. The Respondent had instituted SCC Suit No. 42 of 1995, claiming ownership over the suit premises and seeking eviction of the Petitioners, treating them as tenants. The Petitioners filed a Written Statement disputing the claim and raised the plea of applicability of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (Act No. 13 of 1972).

3. During the pendency of the proceedings, the Respondent moved an application under Order VII Rule 10 CPC (Paper No. 130C) on 03.01.2013 to withdraw the suit with liberty to file a fresh one. The trial court initially allowed the application on 10.01.2013. However, in SCC Revision No. 06 of 2013, the revisional court on 09.07.2013 remanded the matter to the trial court for fresh consideration of the said application after affording opportunity to both sides.

4. Upon remand, the trial court on 10.10.2013 permitted unilateral withdrawal of the application Paper No. 130C and decreed the suit in favour of the Respondent. The Petitioners’ subsequent SCC Revision No. 38 of 2013 was dismissed by the 1^st Additional District Judge on 14.07.2023.

5. Learned Counsel for the Petitioners argued that the entire proceedings culminating in the decree dated 10.10.2013 are vitiated. The trial court acted in violation of the specific directions of the revisional court dated 09.07.2013. Instead of reconsidering Paper No. 130C after affording hearing to both parties, the trial court permitted its unilateral withdrawal and proceeded to decree the suit, thereby denying the Petitioners an effective opportunity to contest the issue.

6. It was urged that the argument of the Respondent that the premise is a “public religious and charitable institution” hence exempt under Section 2(1)(bb) of the Act of 1972 is wholly perverse. No evidence was adduced to establish continuous charitable or religious activity. The mere fact of registration or occasional organization of “bhandara” at the time of Kumbh cannot confer the character of a public charitable institution. Reliance was placed upon the definitions of “charitable institution” and “religious institution” under Sections 3(r) and 3(s) of the Act, 1972.

7. The Petitioners also contended that the tenancy, even if admitted, was year-to-year and could not be terminated by a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act of 1882. The 30-day notice relied upon by the Respondent was invalid, rendering the proceedings unsustainable.

8. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner submitted that both courts below failed to appreciate that the Respondent’s own conductfiling Paper No. 130C to withdraw the suit on account of defects in the plaint, demonstrates that the plaint was not maintainable. Instead of dismissing the suit, the trial court decreed it mechanically, ignoring the admissions of the Respondent itself.

9. It was argued that the orders passed are cryptic, perverse, and non-speaking, having ignored vital pleas and evidence raised by the Petitioners. The judgments are therefore unsustainable in law and liable to be quashed.

10. Per Contra, learned counsel for the Respondent, supported the concurrent findings of the courts below. It was contended that the Respondent, being a registered religious body, is exempt from the provisions of the Rent Control Act by virtue of Section 2(1)(bb).

11. It was argued that the Respondent society, by its very constitution and practice of organizing religious and charitable functions, falls within the meaning of a public religious and charitable institution. The trial court r