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1957 Supreme(MP) 220

High Court Of Madhya Pradesh
P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR
A.S.S.SATHAPPA CHETTIAR - Appellant
Versus
S.RM.AR.RM RAMANATHAN CHETTIAR - Respondents
.
Decided On : 11/28/1957

Advocates Appeared:
A.C.VENKATAKRISHNAN, C.K.DAFTARY, G.GOPALAKRISHNAN NAIR, K.S.KRISHNASWAMI AIYANGAR, M.S.K.SHASTRI, R.Ganapathy Iyer, T.M.Sen

The amount stated by the plaintiff as the value of his claim for partition has ordinarily to be accepted by the court in computing the court-fees payable in respect of the said relief. The value for court-fees and the value for jurisdiction must no doubt be the same in such cases; but it is the value for court-fees stated by the plaintiff that is of primary importance. It is from this value that the value for jurisdiction must be determined.

Headnote:

COURT FEES ACT - SECTION 7(IV)(B) - SUIT FOR PARTITION - VALUATION OF RELIEF - JURISDICTIONAL VALUE - AMENDMENT OF PLAINT - COURT FEES ON PLAINT AND MEMORANDUM OF APPEAL.

Fact of the Case:

Appellant filed a suit for partition of joint family properties and an account of joint family assets. The plaint was valued at Rs. 1,000 under S. 7(iv)(f) of the Court Fees Act and a court fee of Rs. 112-7-0 was paid. For purposes of jurisdiction, the appellant gave Rs. 15,00,000 as the value of his share. The Registry raised an objection that the plaint should have borne court fee under S. 7(v) of the Act. The matter was referred to the Master of the Court and then to the Judge sitting on the Original Side, who held that the appellant was not bound to set aside the prior compromise decree between his father and the respondent and that the plaint was governed by Art. 17-B of Schedule II. The respondent filed a written statement raising several contentions against the appellant's claim for partition and accounts. The trial court held that there was a fair and bona fide settlement of the dispute by the appellant's father and dismissed the appellant's suit. The appellant presented his memorandum of appeal on the same court fees as the plaint. The Registry again raised the question about the sufficiency of fees paid by the appellant. The matter was referred to the Master and then to a Division Bench of the Madras High Court. The Division Bench held that S. 7(v) of the Act was not applicable to the appellant's claim for partition and that the provisions of S. 7(iv)(b) of the Act applied. The appellant was directed to mention his value for the relief of partition under the said section. The appellant valued his relief at Rs. 50,000, paid the deficit court fee and re-presented his memorandum of appeal. The Registry raised another objection that the appellant could not value his relief on the memorandum of appeal under S. 7(iv)(b) without an amendment of the valuation made in the plaint. The appellant applied for a formal amendment of his plaint by substituting Rs. 50,000 in place of Rs. 15,00,000 for the jurisdictional value of his relief. The application was rejected and the appellant was directed to pay deficit court fees on the basis of Rs. 15,00,000, not only on his memorandum of appeal but also on his plaint.

Finding of the Court:

The order passed by the Chamber Judge on 18-10-1951, is not final under S. 5 of the Act since it was not passed under a general or special order appointing the Chamber Judge to hear the reference. The learned judges were justified in assuming jurisdiction under sub-ss. (1) and (2) of S. 12. The decision of the Division Bench of the Madras High Court that the memorandum of appeal should be taxed for the purposes of court-fees under S. 7(iv)(b) of the Act is final under the provisions of S. 5 of the Act and it cannot be reopened at this stage. The appellant is justified in contending that the order directing him to pay court-fees both on the plaint and on the memorandum of appeal on the basis of the valuation for Rs. 15,00,000 is erroneous in law. The amount stated by the plaintiff as the value of his claim for partition has ordinarily to be accepted by the court in computing the court-fees payable in respect of the said relief. The value for court-fees and the value for jurisdiction must no doubt be the same in such cases; but it is the value for court-fees stated by the plaintiff that is of primary importance. It is from this value that the value for jurisdiction must be determined.

Issues: 1. Whether the order passed by the Chamber Judge on 18-10-1951, is final under S. 5 of the Act? 2. Whether the learned judges were justified in assuming jurisdiction under sub-ss. (1) and (2) of S. 12? 3. Whether the decision of the Division Bench of the Madras High Court that the memorandum of appeal should be taxed for the purposes of court-fees under S. 7(iv)(b) of the Act is final under the provisions of S. 5 of the Act? 4. Whether the appellant is justified in contending that the order directing him to pay court-fees both on the plaint and on the memorandum of appeal on the basis of the valuation for Rs. 15,00,000 is erroneous in law?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The order passed by the Chamber Judge on 18-10-1951, is not final under S. 5 of the Act since it was not passed under a general or special order appointing the Chamber Judge to hear the reference. 2. The learned judges were justified in assuming jurisdiction under sub-ss. (1) and (2) of S. 12. 3. The decision of the Division Bench of the Madras High Court that the memorandum of appeal should be taxed for the purposes of court-fees under S. 7(iv)(b) of the Act is final under the provisions of S. 5 of the Act and it cannot be reopened at this stage. 4. The appellant is justified in contending that the order directing him to pay court-fees both on the plaint and on the memorandum of appeal on the basis of the valuation for Rs. 15,00,000 is erroneous in law. The amount stated by the plaintiff as the value of his claim for partition has ordinarily to be accepted by the court in computing the court-fees payable in respect of the said relief. The value for court-fees and the value for jurisdiction must no doubt be the same in such cases; but it is the value for court-fees stated by the plaintiff that is of primary importance. It is from this value that the value for jurisdiction must be determined.

Final Decision: Appeal allowed and the appellant directed to pay additional court-fees on his plaint on the basis of the valuation of Rs. 50,000 within two months from today. No further order need be passed in respect of the memorandum of appeal as adequate court-fees have already been paid.

P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.

( 1 ) THIS is a plaintiff's appeal by special leave against the order passed by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court on 25-1-1955, calling upon him to pay court-fees on the valuation of Rs. 15,00,000 both on his plaint and on his memorandum of appeal and it raises some interesting questions of law under the provisions of the Court Fees act (which will be described hereafter as the Act ).

( 2 ) THE appellant had filed Civil Suit No. 311 of 1951 on the Original Side of the Madras High Court. In this suit he had claimed partition of the joint family properties and an account in respect of the joint family assets managed by the respondent. The appellant is the son of Subbiah Chettiar. His case was that Subbiah had been adopted by Lakshmi Achi in 1922. Lakshmi Achi was the widow of the undivided paternal uncle of the respondent. As a result of his adoption Subbiah became a coparcener in his adoptive family and, as Subbiah's son, the appellant claimed to have a share in the joint family properties and in the assets of the joint family and that was the basis on which a claim for partition and accounts was made by the appellant in his suit. In the plaint it had been alleged that Subbiah had filed a suit for partition of his share and had obtained a decree in the trial court. The respondent had taken an appeal against the said decree in the High Court. Pending the appeal the dispute was settled amicably between the parties and in consideration of payment of a specified sum and delivery of possession of certain sites Subbiah agreed to release all his claims and those of his son, the present appellant, in respect of the properties then in suit. According to the appellant, this compromise transaction did not bind the appellant and so he claimed to recover his share ignoring the said transaction between his father and the respondent. The plaint filed by the appellant valued the claim for accounts at Rs. 1,000 under S. 7, (iv) (f) of the Act and a court-fee of Rs. 112-7-0 was paid on the said amount on an ad valorem basis. In regard to the relief for partition the fixed court-fees of Rs. 100 was paid by the appellant under Art. 17-B (Madras) of Schedule II of the Act. For the purposes of jurisdiction, however, the appellant gave Rs. 15,00,000 as the value of his share. ( 3 ) IT appears that the Registry, on examining the plaint, was inclined to take the view that the plaint should have borne court-fee under S. 7 (v) in respect of the claim for partition. Since the appellant did not accept this view the matter was referred to the Master of the Court who was the taxing officer under the Madras High Court Fees Rules, 1933. The Master felt that the issue raised by the Registry was of some importance and so, in his turn, he referred the dispute to the Judge sitting on the Original Side under S. 5 of the Act. This reference was decided by the Chamber Judge Krishnaswamy Nidu J. , on 18-10-1951. The learned Judge held that the appellant was not bound to set aside the prior compromise decree between his father and the respondent and that the plaint was governed by Art. 17-B of the Schedule II. Accordingly the court-fees paid by the appellant in respect of his claim for partition was held to be order.

( 4 ) IN due course the respondent was served and he filed a written statement raising several contentions against the appellant's claim for partition and accounts. One of the points raised by the respondent was that the compromise and the release deed executed by the appellant's father and the decree that was subsequently passed between the parties were fair and 'bona fide' transactions and, since they amounted to a settlement of the disputed claim by the appellant's father, the plaintiff was bound by them.

( 5 ) RAMASWAMY Gounder J. , who heard the suit tried the respondent's contention about the binding character of the compromise decree as a preliminary issue. The learned judge held that there was a fair and bona fide se















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