B. K. CHATURVEDI, J.

( 1 ) THIS is second appeal by two plaintiffs, Bhojraj and Narsingh Rao, who filed a suit against several defendants for the recovery of possession of -/-/6 share of the village of Ambhori, Tahsil Multai, along with sir fields and some khudkasht land, situate at Ambhori, and a house. The plaintiffs-appellants averred that they had pin-chased the suit property for Rs. 1,000/-from one Wamanrao, Brahmin, of bhainsdahi. They were ousted from possession by the defendants after getting a decree against them from the Court of the Civil Judge (Class II), Multai, under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act. They, therefore, filed this suit for possession of the suit property.

( 2 ) THE defendants resisted the suit on the main ground that Mst. Radhabai, widow of Bapuji, had executed a perpetual lease in their favour and they had been in possession of the property since 1-11-1917.

( 3 ) THE trial Court granted a decree for possession in favour of the plaintiffs on condition of payment of Rs. 2,135/-by them to the defendants 9 to 14, The defendants 10 to 14 filed an appeal in the Court of the Additional District Judge, betul, against the decision of the trial Court; the other affected defendants were impleaded as respondents. A sad (mistake was, however, made by the aforesaid defendant in not impleading Narsingh Rao, plaintiff, as a respondent in the first appeal. The defendants 10 to 14 then made an application to the lower appellate Court for joining Narsingh Rao as a respondent; but this application was made at a time when that appeal itself had become barred by time. Despite it, the lower appellate court allowed Narsing Rao to be joined as a respondent under Order 41, Rule 20, civil Procedure Code or under Section 151 of the Code, giving them benefit of section 5 of the Limitation Act.

( 4 ) THE first point in this second appeal that has been taken is that the decree of the trial Court had become final so far as the plaintiff Narsingh Rao was concerned. The decree of the trial Court was a joint decree and it could not be split up so the whole appeal ought to have been dismissed by the lower appellate Court as barred by time.

( 5 ) MUCH argument has been addressed to me about the wording of Order 41, Rule 20, Civil Procedure Code, and also about the Privy Council decision in Chokalingam chetty v. Secthai Ache, 55 Ind App 7 : (AIR 1927 PC 252 ). I have had occasion to discuss the provisions of Order 41, Rule 20, and the said decision of the Privy council along with other decisions of the High Courts in a Division Bench case in madhya Bharat, reported in Keshorao v. Yeshwantrao, AIR 1957 Madh-B 17. We followed therein the Bombay view as ex-pressed in Alabhai Vajurbhai v. Bhura bhaya, ILR (1937) Bom 602 : (AIR 1937 Bom 401), that if a party to the original proceeding is proposed to be added as a party to the appeal and the time for appeal against him has expired, the question whether the interest of such person proposed to be added still survives in the appeal must depend on the nature of the litigation, the decree passed, the object-matter of the appeal and the effect of the decision in appeal in his absence.

( 6 ) I am of opinion that a joint decree-holder who has not been joined as a respondent within time is not a person "interested in the result of the appeal" within the meaning of Rule 20, Order 41, as explained in the Privy Council decision in Choka-lingum Chetty v. Seethai Ache (cit. sup. ). As the trial Court's decree in his (Narsingh Rao's) favour had become final, he could not have been impleaded subsequently. I am fortified in this view by certain observations made in the decisions reported in Md. Tajammul Hussain Khan v. Dy. Commissioner, barabanki, AIR 1944 Oudh 9, : Ganpat v. Shri Maruti Deosthan, AIR 1952 Nag 181; Krishnaswami v. Sankarappa, AIR 1935 Mad 175; Badri Narayan v. East indian Railway Co. , ILR 5 Pat 755 : (AIR 1927 Pat 23): Kali Dayal Bhattacharjee v. Nagendra Nath, 24 Cal WN 44 : (AIR 1920

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