An order of a ruler having legislative competence has the effect of law and is binding on the government, and the government cannot vary such an order by an executive order.

( 1 ) BY this application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner prays that a writ of certiorari be issued for quashing an order of the Government of the former State of Vindhya Pradesh made in 1954 about the re-fixation of his pension and that a writ of mandamus be issued to the opponent Slate for payment to the petitioner of pension in accordance with an order dated the 3rd April 1948, of the Maharaja of Rewa, which was published in an extra-ordinary Gazette of that date.

( 2 ) WHEN this petition first came up for hearing before a Division Bench consisting of Bhutt, C. J. and Sharma, J. , the learned Judges felt some doubt about the correctness of the Division Bench decision of this Court in State of M. B. v. Behramji Dungaji and Co. , 1958 MPC 82: (AIR 1958 Madh-Pra 71) on which strong reliance was placed bv the petitioner. Accordingly they referred the case to a Full Bench for disposal.

( 3 ) THE material facts are that the petitioner Lal Rampal Singh entered the Rewa State service in 1922. He served in several departments. On 3rd April 1948 the Maharaja of Rewa passed an order permitting him to retire from that date on a full pension of Rs. 350/- p. m. condoning "some breaks" in his service and giving him "four accelerated increments" in the grade of Rs. 500-20-700. On 4th April 1948 the United State of Vindhya Pradesh, which included the farmer Rewa State, was inaugurated. This United State did not last long. By an agreement dated the 26th December 1949 the Rulers of the Covenanting States of the United State of Vindhya Pradesh ceded to the Government of India the full and exclusive authority, jurisdiction and powers for and in relation to the governments of those States with effect from 1st January 1950, and the State of Vindhya Pradesh was then administered as the Chief Commissioner's Province of Vindhya Pradesh. On the commencement of the Constitution, it became a Part-C State and remained so till the formation of the new State of Madhya Pradesh on 1st November 1956 in which it was included. The applicant continued to receive, his pension at the rate of Rs. 350/-p. m. until 27th March 1953. On this date he was informed by the Vindhya Pradesh Government that the question of the continuance of the pension drawn by him under the Maharaja's order was under consideration and that pending final decision in the matter the payment of the pension had been suspended. Thereafter a communication was received by the applicant on 9th January 1954 from the Joint Secretary to the Vindhya Pradesh Government in the Appointments Department informing him that the Government had decided that he should be allowed pension for the actual service rendered by him after excluding the periods of "break" in service condoned by the Maharaja and the advance increments granted to him by the Maharaja; and that the Comptroller had been asked to re-fix his pension accordingly.

( 4 ) THE petitioner unsuccessfully protested against this action of the Vindhya Pradesh Government and ultimately in 1956 he instituted a suit in the Court of the Additional District Judge of Rewa for enforcement of the order dated the 3rd April 1948 of the Maharaja of Rewa. The Union of India and the State of Madhya Pradesh, who were made defendants in the suit, raised the plea that the suit was barred under Section 4 of the Pensions Act, 1871. In reply, the applicant contended that the provisions of the Pensions Act barring a civil suit were ultra vires and void. The Additional District Judge referred the matter under Section 113 of the Civil Procedure Code to the Judicial Commissioner's Court, Vindhva Pradesh. for decision. The learned Judicial Commissioner, following the decision pronounced by him in another case viz. State of Vindhya Pradesh v. Girja Prasad, S. A. No. 4 of 1956 (VP), held that no provision of the Pensions Act was ultra vires and that the suit was barred under that Act. The applicant's suit was, therefore, dismis