( 1 ) THESE are two appeals by the plaintiff from orders dismissing his restoration applications under Order 9 Rule 9 Civil Procedure Code in two suits, in both, not on merits, but on the ground that judgments of dismissal of suits had been passed under Order 17 Rule 3 (and not under Order 17 Rule 2); so that, the plaintiff should have filed regular appeals from the decrees dismissing the suit. In reply, the defendants-respondents in both the suits have raised a preliminary ground that these appeals are prima facie time barred and the delay cannot be condoned by the fact of the appellant having prosecuted the appeal's in good faith in the wrong Court, namely, that of the District Judge. Such a ground could, in a suit, be raised under Section 14 of the Limitation Act; in an appeal, this can be urged under Section 5 of that Act as "sufficient cause" why the delay should be condoned. In fact the parties have argued about this point of limitation more elaborately than the merits of the appeals. The question is whether there was want at diligence or gross negligence when counsel advised the appellant and the latter accepted that the appeal should be filed in the Court of th