The Claims Tribunal has jurisdiction to try a claim for compensation for damage to a car if the claim is made jointly with a claim for compensation for bodily injury sustained in the same accident.

( 1 ) THIS appeal arises out of a claim made by the appellant before the Motor vehicles Claims Tribunal, Jabalpur, on the allegation that there was a collision between his car (No. MPJ 9339) and the motor bus (No. MPJ 790) belonging to the respondent, No. 2, on 13-9-1959. It was alleged that the petitioner sustained bodily injury in the accident for which damages amounting to Rs. 10,200/- were claimed. It was also alleged that in the same accident, the petitioner's car was damaged and on account of the damage to his car, Rs. 6,000/- as damages were claimed.

( 2 ) THE Claims Tribunal held after hearing arguments that it had no jurisdiction to try the claim in respect of damage to the car and decided issue No. 10 (a) against the appellant. It is against this order that the present appeal has been filed.

( 3 ) BEFORE we heard arguments on merits, a preliminary point was raised on behalf of the respondents challenging the tenability of this appeal. The objection is based on the provision contained in Section 110-D of the Indian Motor Vehicles Act (hereinafter called the 'act') which reads as under:--

"section 110-D (1):--Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), any person aggrieved by an award of a Claims Tribunal may, within ninety days from the date of award, prefer an appeal to the High Court: provided that the High Court may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of ninety days, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal in time. 2. No appeal shall lie against any award of a Claims Tribunal, if the amount in dispute in the appeal is less than two thousand rupees. "

( 4 ) LEARNED counsel for the respondents argues that according to this section, an aggrieved person has been given the right of an appeal only when there comes into existence an award of Claims Tribunal. In the instant case, it was urged that the order passed by the Claims Tribunal did not amount to an award and, therefore, the appeal was not competent.

( 5 ) ON the other hand, it was contended by Shri J. P. Sanghi on behalf of the appellant, that not to give an award itself was an award under the particular circumstances of this case and, therefore, the order passed by the Claims Tribunal was appealable.

( 6 ) IN our view, the appeal must be held to be competent because the effect of the order clearly is that to the extent of damages claimed for damage to the car, the claims Tribunal has definitely refused to go into the question and, therefore, so far as the Tribunal is concerned, the order [passed amounts to that the damages in these proceedings could not be awarded to the appellant. At any rate, the order of the Claims Tribunal has the effect of doing away with the award in this respect altogether. It would also be seen that the remedy by way of a recourse to the Civil court is completely bailed by Section 110-F of the Act wherein it has been provided that where any Claims Tribunal has been constituted for any area, no civil Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any question relating to any claim for compensation which may be adjudicated upon by the Claims Tribunal for that area. . . . . . . '

( 7 ) A somewhat similar argument was ad-dressed to the Court with regard to an award under the provisions of the Arbitration Act in the case reported in Jagdish mahton v. Sundar Manton, AIR 1949 Pat 393. It was contended in that case as it is contended here that there was in fact no award and, therefore, the appeal did not lie. Their Lordships meeting this argument observed in para 12 of the judgment as under:-

"the principal reason urged against his interpretation is that on the finding of the Court below there was in fact no award. I have, however, pointed out that in the cases coming under Clause (b) of Section 30, there is really no award and yet the section provides for the setting aside of the "award". Similarly, Section 33 speaks of a "party to an arbitration agreement''