A suit against a carrier for compensation for non-delivery of goods is governed by Article 31 of the Limitation Act, irrespective of whether the non-delivery is due to conversion or any other reason.

( 1 ) THIS is a Letters Patent appeal from a decision of Tare J. By that decision the learned Single Judge reversing the judgments of the Courts below remitted the plaintiff-respondent's suit praying for a decree for Rs. 484/11/3 against the appellant for further trial.

( 2 ) BRIEFLY stated the plaintiff's case was that eight bales of cloth were consigned to him by Messrs Bachharaj Amolakchand of Nagpur from Nagpur to Itarsi on 3rd january 1947; that on 18th January 1947 seven of these bates were delivered but one was not delivered as it was said to have been stolen; that subsequently a case of theft in respect of the bale was registered against one Dwarkaprasad who was tried and convicted for the offence of theft; that the baie was also recovered from dwarkaprasad and during the course of the criminal trial was handed over by the court to the A. D. C. I. , Bhopal; and that it was in the month of November 1952 that the plaintiff came to know for the first time thai the bale had been delivered to the A. D. C. I. , Bhopal. Tile further averment of the plaintiff was that after the receipt of the bale by the a. D. C. I. , Bhopal, the railway administration became a trustee of the property belonging to the plaintiff and that, therefore the railway authorities were bound' to return the bale or its price. The plantiff's prayer was that a decree for Rs. 484/11/3 be passed against the defendant, and, if the bale had been sold at a higher price, a decree for the amount of that higher price be passed against the defendant. The suit was instituted on 3rd November 1954.

( 3 ) THE learned Civil Judge, Hoshangabad, who tried the suit dismissed it holding that it was barred by time under Article 31 of the Limitation Act. He relied on a decision of the Nagpur J. C's Court to which reference will be made shortly. In appeal, the learned Additional District Judge, Hoshangabad, upheld the decision of the trial Court. In second appeal, our learned brother Tare J. took the view that the cause of action for the suit was not non-delivery of the bale hut ihe refusal of the railway authorities to deliver the bale to the plaintiff after it had been received by them from the criminal Court; that this was another cause of action arising in november, 1952; and that consequently the suit was governed not by Article 31 but by Article 48 of the Limitation Act. He found support for his view in the decision of Patna High Court in Sundarji Shivji v. Secy. of State, ILR 13 Pat 752: (AIR 1934 Pat 507), He further observed that the decisions in G. I. P. Ry. Co. v. Radhakisan Taikisan, AIR 1926 Nag 57 and Ramlal v. B. N. Ry. Co. , Ltd. , Calcutta, 31 Nag LR (Sup) 79 : (AIR 1936 Nag 21) were not in point. Accordingly he held that the plaintiff's suit was within time and made an order of remand.

( 4 ) AT the outset learned counsel appearing for the respondent raised the preliminary objection that this appeal is incompetent as the order of the learned single Judge is not a 'judgment' as used in Clause 10 of the Letters Patent' This objection cannot prevail in view of the clear decision of a Full Bench of this Court in Manohar Damodar v. Baliram Ganpat, ILR (1952) Nag 471 : (AIR 1952 Nag 357) (FB ). In that case the Full Bench has held that when a remand order by a single Judge sitting in second appeal merely remits an issue for trial or orders some evidence to be taken but does not decide the controversy either wholly or partially, then the remand order is not a judgment within the meaning of Clause 10 of the Letters Patent; but where the Court sets aside a decree making an order on the merits of the controversy and remits the case for trial according to its decision, the order is a judgment Hidayatullah J. , with whom Sinha C. J. agreed, observed that the term ''judgment" as used in Clause 10, means a decision in an action whether final, preliminary or interlocutory whichdecides either wholly or partially, but conclusively in so far as the Court is concern