A notice to the counsel of a party is sufficient notice to the party of the filing of an arbitration award, for the purpose of triggering the 30-day limitation period for filing objections to the award.

( 1 ) THIS is an appeal under section 30 of the Arbitration Act from an order disallowing objections filed by the non-petitioner Chhotelal (appellant ). A preliminary objection has been raised by Shri Patankar learned counsel for the respondent Jaraunadas that the appeal is barred by time.

( 2 ) MATERIAL facts are that Jamuna Das made a petition under section 14 of the arbitration Act to the District Judge, Gwalior, for filing of an award. Notice of this petition was sent to the non-petitioner Chhotelal to appear on 19-3-1953. On the last mentioned date the non-petitioner appeared and filed certain objections. The award dated 26-12-1952 was also filed on that very day as is clear from the proceedings recorded by the Trial Judge. The counsel for the non-petitioner has signed below the order passed by the trial Judge on 19-3-1953. However, it was on 5-10-1953 that the non-applicant filed his objections to the award. These objections were dismissed as barred by time by the trial Judge on 9-2-1959. It is against this order that the non-petitioner filed this appeal on 27-6-1960. Obviously enough, the appeal is barred by time.

( 3 ) HOWEVER, on 6-7-1960 an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act was made for condonation of deray on the gronnd that from the order dated 9-2-1953 the appellant had filed an application for review on 4-4-1959; the review application was admitted and notice was issued to the petitioner, but it was eventually dismissed on 21-3-1960. The appellant prays that the period between 4-4-1959 and 21-3-1960 be excluded. Shri Dwivedi relies on Brij Indar Singh v. Kanshi Ram, AIR 1917 PC 156. The facts of that case were rather peculiar as set out in the decision of Mr. Justice Johnstone. A review had in that case been allowed but later on the decision accepting the review was held to ba ultra vires and was set aside. Thereafter an appeal was filed. Their Lordships of the Judicial committee were told on the basis of certain decision of the Punjab and Calcutta high Courts that there was a general rule to exclude the time spent in review proceedings from the time to be computed for an appeal. We do not find in that decision that the Privy Council independently herd that view. It is one thing to say that diligently prosecuting a review proceeding is sufficient cause for excusing delay within the meaning of section 5 of the Limitation Act and another to hold that the entire period spent must be excluded from computing the period of limitation. For, if it were so, section 14 would have been made applicable to appeals, as it has been to suits. By accepting the proposition that the period spent in prosecuting a review application must be excluded while computing the period for appeal, will tantamount to add the words "or appeal" after the word "suit" in section 14 Sub-section (1 ). The scheme of the Limitation Act leaves no manner of doubt that certain provisions are made applicable to suits and some others to appeals and yet some others to both; so about applications, We have no quarrel with the proposition that principles of certain provisions applicable to suits may within legitimate limits be applied to appeals, for instance, if an appeal is otherwise competent but is presented to a wrong Court, then on its return for being presented to proper Court the principle of section 14 can be applied, while condoning the delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act. But the difference will be that if section 14 were applied in terms the whole period spent in the wrong court will be excluded while if that is deemed to be a sufficient cause within the meaning of section 5, the delay after the return of the appeal for presentation to proper Court up to the time that it is actually presented will have to be accounted for.

( 4 ) IN our opinion the correct law was laid down in Ram Rup v. Naik Ram, AIR 1926 all 252. It is well established that when an appeal is filed in a wrong Court and is therefore taker) back,