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1962 Supreme(MP) 138

High Court Of Madhya Pradesh
T. P. Naik and A. H. Khan, JJ.
DAMODARDAS NAGORI MOTILAL - Appellant
Versus
THE RUBBY GENERAL INSURANCE CO.LTD. - Respondents
First Appeal 10 Of 1959
Decided On : 09/12/1962

Advocates Appeared:
B.L.AGRAWAL, Mungre, P.L.DUBEY

Headnote:(1) Insurance - interpretation of the terms of the policy of insurance - insurer excepting damage by 'riot' and "civil commotion" - riot is to be construed as used in law - interpretation of "civil commotion" - cause of loss - proximate cause is to be seen.

       A clause in the insurance policy excepted the liability of the insurer company if the damage was caused to the insured car by "riot" or "civil commotion". The car of the plaintiff was burnt by a crowd of one or two hundred persons excited by the death of a child by accident. The question for decision was whether the insurer company was liable to pay the price of the car.

       Held : Neither "riot" nor "civil commotion" has been defined in the policy of insurance. But, it is well settled rule of judicial construction that where terms of legal art are used in a policy of insurance, they must be given their technical meaning. Therefore, "riot" when it occurs in a policy of insurance, is to be interpreted with the special meaning attached to it by the Criminal law. (1924) A.C. 836, (1907) 2 K.B. 853 relied on. [Para 7

       The term “civil commotion” has no such strict legal meaning, yet it has come to have a fixed meaning by recognised judicial interpretations. Although a civil commotion may, technically speaking, also constitute a riot, the phrase is used to indicate a stage between a riot and a civil war, (1909) 1 K.B. 785 relied on. [Para 8

       It was argued that the loss was in consequence of the accident and the mere fact that riot broke out after the accident does not make any difference.

       Held: In insurance law, where more than one cause operate to occasion the loss, the rule of proximity is resorted to determine what the proximate cause of the loss was. By proximate cause is not meant the latest, but the direct, dominant, operative and efficient one. In determining the direct, dominant and efficient cause, distinction has to be made between an accident facilitating the loss and an accident causing the loss. The loss in this case was caused by a riot and the risk was expressly excepted by the policy of insurance, the defendant company was not liable. [Paras 18, 19 & 20

       (2) Penal Code - S. 146 - riot - essential ingredients of.

       The essential - ingredients of the offence, of riot, are:

       (a) There must be an assembly of five or more persons;

       (b) It must have for its common object one of the five unlawful objects specified in section 141 of the Indian Penal Code, so that it becomes an "unlawful assembly";

       (c) Force or violence must be used by such an unlawful assembly or by any member of it, in prosecution of the common object of such an assembly. [Para 9

( 1 ) THE suit of the plaintiff-appellant was for the recovery of Rs. 16,000/- from the defendant insurance Company (hereinafter referred to as 'the Company'), which, he alleged, became due to him on the comprehensive policy of his motor vehicle insurance when it suffered an accident at Morena on or about 8-11-1947. In the equivalent Citation: alternative, he claimed that the dispute may be referred to arbitration, in terms of the policy of insurance, through the intervention of the Court as the respondent company had declined to have it so referred.

( 2 ) THE case of the plaintiff was that he was the owner of his Studebaker commander Land Cruiser Sedanbody car, bearing registered No. G. S. 2190 L, which was insured for Rs. 16,000/- with the defendant Company under a comprehensive policy of insurance (policy No. 6039, dated 23-9-1947) for the period 1-10-1947 to 30-9-1943. On 8-11-1947, he had gone to Morena along with shri M. L. Gupta, Advocate. The motor-car was being driven by a licensed driver, matapurkar. There, at about 5 p. m. , a young boy v/as unfortunately knocked down by the motorcar on the main road in front of the District Court. The injured boy was removed to the house of the nearest medical practitioner immediately after the accident; but, in spite of all possible medical aid that was given to him, he did not survive for long. Getting the news of the death of the boy, a crowd of about 100 to 200 persons, which included the relations of the boy and their sympathisers, gathered round the motor-car and, without waiting to enquire whether the driver was at fault, began to throw stones at it. The plaintiff was removed from the scene of occurrence under police protection, and subsequently the motor-car was found so extensively burnt and damaged as to be beyond repairs. According to the plaintiff, the motor-car was damaged and burnt by the relatives and sympathisers of the deceased boy on account of private revenge and that he was entitled to compensation from the Company under his policy of insurance. It was further alleged that, under the terms of the policy, the question of the defendant's responsibility ought to have been referred to arbitration but the defendant unreasonably did not agree to it. It was, therefore, prayed that a decree for Rs. 16,000/-, the value of the motor-car, be passed against the defendant company; or, in the alternative, the matter in dispute be referred to arbitration as per Clause 7 of the policy of insurance through the intervention of the Court.

( 3 ) THE defendant, in its written statement, inter alia, contended that as the accident, loss, damage or liability in question, directly or indirectly, proximately or remotely, was occasioned by, or arose out of, or in connection with, a 'riot' or a 'civil commotion', the risk of the company was expressly excepted under the terms of the policy of insurance; that under Clause 7 of the policy of insurance, as the dispute was not referred to arbitration Within twelve calendar months from the date of the defendant's disclaimer of its liability, the claim of the plaintiff was deemed to have been abandoned and he was not en-titled to claim any damages under his policy of insurance.

( 4 ) THE trial Court dismissed the suit of the plaintiff, inter alia, holding (a) that the plaintiff's motor-car was burnt down as a result of a 'riot' and 'civil commotion', and as such, according to the terms of the policy of insurance, the defendant Company was not liable; and equivalent Citation: (b) that Clause 7 of the policy of insurance did not debar or disentitle the plaintiff from filing the suit.

( 5 ) THE most important issue in this case is, whether the liability of the defendant company for damages is excepted in cases where loss or damage is the result of, or occasioned by a 'riot' or a 'civil commotion'. For, if it is so excepted, the defendant Company would not be liable and the other questions raised would not necessarily arise for consideration.

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