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1964 Supreme(MP) 142

High Court Of Madhya Pradesh
P. V. Dixit, C. J. and K. L. Pandey, J.
MUKUNDLAL AGARWAL - Appellant
Versus
SHANKERLAL VISHWANATH PRASAD - Respondents
Misc. Second Appeal 155 Of 1964
Decided On : 11/24/1964

Headnote:(1) Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (M.P.) - S. 31 - forum of second appeal - is the High Court - grounds are different from those under section 100, C.P.C.

       The first appeal under section 31 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, is not before the District Judge as a persona designata, but is before the District Court. The Court of District Judge is appealed to as one of the ordinary Courts with regard to whose procedure, orders and decrees the ordinary rules of the Code of Civil Procedure apply and any general right of appeal from its decision likewise attaches. AIR 1953 SC 357, (1913) AC 546 & AIR 1948 PC 12 relied on.

       An appeal against an order passed in first appeal under section 31 lies to the High Court and no where else. What section 32 does is to lay down the grounds on which a second appeal would be competent, and to that extent modifies section 100, C.P.C. The grounds enumerated are different from those stated in section 100 C.P.C. [Para 3

       (2) Limitation Act, 1908 - Art. 156 - Civil P.C. - O. 47 R. 1 - original decree superseded by a decree passed in review - limitation for appeal starts from the decree in review.

       When a decree passed by a Court is superseded by a decree in review an appeal from the previous decree is incompetent and the limitation for appeal starts from the decree passed in review. 8 MPLC 22 relied on. [Para 4

       (3) Interpretation of statutes - construction of statutes - certain amount of common sense should be applied - object of the statute should be kept in view.

       A certain amount of common sense must be applied in construing a statute. Consequently, while construing a statute the object of its enactment should be kept in mind and the statute should be construed with reference to its intended scope and purpose, and in order to carry out its purpose rather than defeat it. (1953) 1 WLR 649 relied on. [Para 8

       (4) Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (M.P.) - Ss. 4 to 11 - object of - is the control rent.

       The object and intention of the Act is to control 'rent' and to prevent landlords from profiteering in rent and protect tenants from being compelled to pay more than a fair rent, and at the same time the Act is not intended to operate in such a way as to penalise the landlord by disregarding altogether the rise in rent along with the prodigious rise in prices all these years since 1940. [Para 8

       (5) Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (M.P.) - Ss. 2 (h), 5, 7, 8 & 10 - amount fixed by the Rent Controlling Authority - is not the standard rent as defined in section 2 (h) or as laid down in section 7 or 8 - it is a reasonable rent - sections 7 and 8 lay down guiding principles and the limit.

       What the Rent Controlling Authority fixes under sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 10 is not the 'standard rent' spoken of in section 2 (h) or section 7 but 'reasonable rent'. The effect of the prohibition contained in section 5 that rent in excess of 'standard rent' shall not be recoverable and of the direction in sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 10, is that in fixing reasonable rent, the Rent Controlling Authority must be guided by the principles as are contained in sections 7 and 8 and the circumstances of the case. Within the limits of the 'standard rent' computed in accordance with the principles laid down in sections 7 and 8, the Rent Controlling Authority has discretion to fix a reasonable rent. [Para 8

       (6) Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (M.P.) - S. 7 Cl. (1) and (2) - increase provision - applies to both the clauses (1) & (2).

       Clause (1) as well as clause (2) of section 7 both prescribe a statutory datum 1-line of rent. The increase allowed by the increase provision occurring at the end of clause (2), applies both to clause (1) and clause (2) of section 7. Its applicability to both the clauses only carries out the purpose underlying the enhancement of the datum 1-line rent by a certain percentage. 1964 JLJ-SN 81 overruled. [Para 12

DIXIT, C. J.

( 1 ) THIS appeal has come up before us on a reference made by one of us, and arises out of proceedings initiated by the appellant Mukundlal under Section 10 of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, (hereinafter called the act), for fixation of 'standard rent' of certain shop premises situated in Sarafa ward, Jabalpur, in the occupation of the respondent Shankarlal as Mukundlal's tenant.

( 2 ) THE Rent Controlling Authority found that the landlord had not kept the accommodation in good and "tenantable repairs"; that the rent as shown in the municipal assessment register for the year 1947-48 was Rs. 90/- per month; and that on 7th December 1948 fair rent had been fixed at Rupees 70/- per month in respect of the accommodation by the competent authority under the C. P. and berar Regulation of Letting of Accommodation Act, 1946, which was then in force in Jabalpur. The authority took the view that in fixing 'standard rent', the provisions of Section 7 of the Act had to be given due consideration; that the matter was governed by Section 7 (i) of the Act; and that as reasonable rent in respect of the accommodation had been fixed in 1948 at Rs. 70/- the standard rent under the Act should be fixed at Rs. 70/-per month. The landlord then preferred an appeal before the District Judge under Section 31 of the Act. The learned District Judge first dismissed the appeal by an order dated 19th March 1964 which stated that in view of the decision of this Court in Mahabir v. Jotumal, 1964 MPLJ (Notes) 46: MSA No. 107 of 1963 dated 29-11-1963 learned counsel appearing for the landlord Mukundlaldid not wish to press the appeal. Thereafter an application for review of that order was filed by the landlord. The review was founded on the ground that at the time of the hearing of the appeal what the landlord's counsel stated was not that he did not wish to press the appeal but that it was that in view of the decision of this Court referred to above the learned district Judge, who was bound to follow that decision, had no other alternative but to dismiss the appeal, so as to enable the landlord to canvass again in this Court the question decided in the case of Mahabir, 1964 MPLJ (Notes) 46 (supra ). The review application was ultimately granted and on 3lst August 1964 the learned district Judge following Mahabir's case, 1964 MPLJ (Notes) 46 made a fresh order dismissing Mukundlal's appeal holding that under Section 7 (i) of the Act the reasonable rent of Rs. 70/- per month fixed under the C. P. and Berar Regulation of Letting of Accommodation Act, 1946, would automatically become the 'standard rent' of the accommodation. The landlord then preferred a second appeal in this Court under Section 32 of the act. When that appeal first came for hearing before one of us (the Chief Justice), shvi Dabir, learned counsel for the appellant Mukundlal, assailed the correctness of the construction put on Section 7 of the Act in Mahabir's case, 1964 MPLJ (Notes) 46 (supra ). As the question of the meaning and effect of Section 7 of the act frequently arises in proceedings for fixation of standard rent under the Act and as it is a substantial one not free from difficulty, it was thought necessary to have the question of construction of Section 7 of the Act decided by a larger Bench rather than by a Judge sitting singly.

( 3 ) BEFORE dealing with the merits of the appeal, it is necessary to dispose of the preliminary objections raised by the learned counsel for the respondent to the maintainability and competency of this appeal. It was first said that Section 32 of the Act, under which this appeal had been preferred, did not indicate this Court as the forum of appeal: and that in fact the Act nowhere provided as to where a second appeal would lie. The question as to the forum of second appeal admits of an easy answer. Under Section 31, an appeal lies against an order of the Rent Controlling Authority to the Court of District Judge and not to t





























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