( 1 ) THE only question that arises for consideration in this second appeal is whether the notice to quit (Ex. P-6) served by the plaintiffs-landlords on the defendant-tenant on 1-7-1960 under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, calling upon him to vacate the suit premises on 31-7-1960, in respect of a monthly tenancy commencing on the 1st--an English Calendar month--was an invalid notice, as it did not expire with the end of the month of the tenancy.

( 2 ) UNDER Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, so far as is relevant for our purpose, in the absence of a contract or local law or usage to the contrary, a lease of immovable property from month to month is "terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by fifteen days' notice 'expiring with the end of a month of the tenancy'". (Underlining (here into ' ') is mine ). The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Harihar Banerji v. Ramshashi Roy, ilr 46 Cal 458 at p. 472: (AIR 1918 PC 102 at p. 107), has pointed out that the principles applying to the case were similar to those which were applicable in england and that notices to quit "are to be construed not with a desire to find faults in them which would render them defective but to be construed ut res magis valeat quam pereat. " it is true that a notice to quit must be clear and certain, so as to bind the party who gives it and to enable the party to whom it is given to act upon it, at the time when it is given [doe d. Lyster v. Goldwin (1841) 2 QB 143] and that it must not be ambiguous. But even when ambiguous words are used in a notice, the rule of construction, in the words of Abbott. C. J. , in Doe d. Untingtower v. Culliford (1824) 4 Dow and Ry. 248, is as under: "there is one rule of construction in cases of this nature which is no less sound than ancient, namely, to give such a sense to ambiguous words as will effectuate the intention of the parties. " it has been pointed out in Mulla's Transfer of Property Act, 4th Edition. , at page 619-"the rule has been to make lame and inaccurate notices sensible where the recipient cannot have been misled as to the intention of the giver. A liberal construction is, therefore, put upon a notice to quit in order that it should not be defeated by inaccuracies either in the description of the premises, or the name of the tenant or the date of expiry of the notice. "

( 3 ) GENERALLY speaking, a notice to quit should expire 'with the end of a month of the tenancy', which would expire at midnight of the last day, and before the anniversary of its commencement, A notice can, therefore, require a tenant to vacate at or before the midnight of the last day. But even so, as the tenant has the legal right to occupy the premises till the last moment of the midnight, a notice requiring him to vacate on the first moment of the next day cannot also be said to be bad. However, the validity of a notice ought not to depend on such hypertechnical considerations and consequently the Courts have held both-notices expiring on the last day and those expiring on the next day--to be valid, thus leaving out of account the fraction of a clay. The question has been discussed at some length in Sidebotham v. Holland (1895) 1 QB 378, where the tenancy commenced on the 19th May 1890 and the question was whether the notice to quit on 19th May 1894 given by the landlord on November 17, 1893, was a good notice when the law required six Calendar months' notice to quit. The said notice, which expired on the anniversary of the day on which the tenancy commenced, was objected to on the ground that it was bad because it expired one day too late. Lindley, L. J. , repelling the contention, said: "the contention is that, as the tenancy commenced, 'on' the 19th and not 'from' the 19th, the notice should have been to quit on the 18th and not on the 19th. Having regard to the decision in Clayton's case (1585) 5 co. Rep. la, I think that, although the agreement was signed on the 19th, and